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SYNOPSIS
Public sector housing is important. Its particular importance in 
Glasgow derives from the fact that over 57% of households in the City are 
Local Authority tenants.
This thesis examines a new project being set up by Glasgow District 
Council in three high stress areas of its housing stock. The project, 
called the Community Ownership Programme, is the first of its kind in 
Scotland. It involves the formation of par-value housing co-operatives by 
the tenants, who will purchase their houses collectively from the Council 
and subsequently manage them along co-operative lines.
The study begins with a brief chapter establishing the general context 
of the public sector in Britain, touching briefly on housing policies at a 
national level. Against this background, Chapter 2 examines the problems 
of difficult-to-let estates, their characterising factors and some 
fundamental causes. It then goes on to discuss some significant reports in 
this field and the remedial action they suggest. Finally some conclusions 
are drawn about future policies.
Chapter 3 brings this discussion down to the local context. The two­
fold nature of Glasgowfs housing problem is described, setting the scene 
for the next chapter. Against this framework, Chapter 4 examines the 
influences actually brought to bear in shaping the Community Ownership 
Programme, focussing particularly on the way in which the District Council 
have drawn on the resources and experience available to develop a new model 
to improve public sector housing.
In Chapter 5, this model is discussed in detail. Par-value co­
operatives are described, as are the three main factors involved - the 
tenants, the dwellings and finance. Finally the legal and financial
(i)
procedures of establishing a co-operative are examined.
Three detailed case studies are then presented in Chapter 6. In each 
of these, a preliminary sketch is given of the background, followed by a 
narrative account of the development of the co-operative and the proposed 
improvements. In Chapter 7 an attempt is made to tackle the difficult 
question of evaluation.
Chapter 8 brings together and reviews some of the findings of the case 
studies in relation to the future development of the co-operatives. The 
analysis focusses particularly on two variables which are critical to the 
expansion of the project, namely community action capacity and continued 
political feasibility. This is followed by some concluding remarks.
(ii)
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CHAPTER ONE 
AN INTRODUCTION
PREFACE
This chapter briefly reviews the development of housing policy at a 
national level since the Second World War. It outlines the growth of 
owner-occupation and the decline of the private rented sector in order to 
establish the general context of the development of public sector housing. 
This is essential to later analysis.
There is insufficient space here to do justice to these complex issues 
and they have been discussed at length elsewhere. The purpose of this 
chapter is merely to set the scene for the rest of the thesis.
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THE GROWTH OF CWNER-OCCUPATION
One of the most important changes in the post-war British housing 
scene has been the rise of owner-occupation. In 1945, only 26% of 
households were owner-occupiers, but by 1978 this figure had increased to 
over 53% and is now estimated to be over 60%. Thus owner-occupation is now 
the single largest tenure category.
A number of reasons lie behind this change and we shall examine each 
of these briefly.
A variety of fiscal policies have evolved to make owner-occupation an 
attractive proposition. Tax relief on interest payments was first 
formalised in 1951 and is now a major subsidy to house purchasers, 
amounting to £1,960m in 1980-81 and estimated at £2,750m in 1983-84 (Murie, 
1984). In addition, sales of residences are exempt from capital gains tax. 
Before 1963, under Schedule A income tax, owner-occupiers were taxed on the 
imputed income from property, but this has since been abolished and owner- 
occupiers receive an imputed rental income. Thus the financial advantages 
of owner-occupation are both large and clear.
As Short (1982) points out, the reasons why the State has encouraged 
owner-occupation are many. Since the mid-1960s both major parties have 
been committed to expanding owner-occupation. The owner-occupiers, now a 
majority, constitute a powerful political force for any government, or 
prospective government to reckon with. A whole series of government 
documents have pointed to the ’’naturalness” of home ownership. While there 
may be a universal desire to improve one’s housing conditions, experience 
in countries such as Sweden, West Germany and Holland shows that owner- 
occupation is not the only route.
This expansion of owner-occupation has also been encouraged by the
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policies and practice of council house sales. These were first introduced 
in the post-war period by the Conservative Government in 1952 and were 
enforced by the 1980 Housing Act (in England and Wales) and the Tenants 
Rights Etc. (Scotland) Act 1980 which give local authority tenants the 
right to buy their accommodation.
Since 1979 over 600,000 council houses have been sold - more than many 
experts anticipated. There has been a strong regional variation in the 
pattern of sales - both regionally and locally the areas with the highest 
rates of owner-occupation have been where sales are concentrated. The 
houses sold have been some of the best council stock on the better quality 
estates. Very few sales have been in difficult-to-let areas. In the long 
term, this will lead to a smaller, poor quality sector with less choice for 
those who remain as council tenants.
THE DECLINE CF PRIVATE RENTING
Over the course of this century the story of housing has been 
dominated by the decline of the private rented sector. Before the First 
World War almost nine out of every ten households rented accommodation from 
a private landlord. Buy the Second World War almost seven out of every ten 
were private renters. The pace of decline quickened in the post-war years 
and by 1978 less than two out of every ten households were in private 
renting. Thus it has changed from being the main tenure category to a 
minority.
This decline reflects the response by landlords to changes in the 
relative rates of return provided by alternative forms of investment. 
Before 1914, rented accommodation was one of the most profitable 
investments but by 1970 in contrast, landlords could only obtain an 
estimated 6% on their investment compared with higher rates of return from
3
building societies and other financial institutions. These relatively low 
returns on investment in private rented accommodation have been exacerbated 
by rent controls and methods of taxation.
The response of the landlord has been twofold. The main one has been 
to sell off properties. Between 1938 and 1975 landlords sold 2.6 million 
dwellings to owner-occupiers, almost a third of a million to local 
authorities and up to half a million were converted to another use (Short 
1982, p.175). A second response has been to reduce maintenance and 
improvement expenditure, leading to a further deterioration in the quality 
of the private-rental housing stock.
This pattern of disinvestment and lack of improvement, together with 
the absence of new building has combined to produce a broad picture of an 
ageing housing stock of much poorer quality than either owner-occupied or 
local authority housing. In general, private rented dwellings provide the 
poorest form of accommodation on the British housing market.
LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING
The general story of LA housing in post-war Britain has been one of a 
period of initial expansion followed by a period of downgrading. In this 
section we will examine the way in which council housing has evolved since 
the Second World War.
The 1945 General Election was won by the Labour Party on a manifesto 
which emphasised the importance of housing policy - 41% of the electorate 
sampled felt that housing was the most important issue. The housing 
sitution was extremely grim. The war had brought with it vast destruction, 
a severe fall in building output and an increase in the population, all of 
which was compounded by the existence of a pre-war backlog. 750,000 new 
dwellings were needed to provide a separate dwelling "for every family
4
desiring one". Thus the state sector was chosen as the main instrument of 
policy, to direct housing to those in greatest need.
In 1946, LAs were given the ability to purchase land for council house 
building and the government subsidy for each house was increased. Council 
house completions increased from a negligible amount in 1945 to over
160,000 in 1948, and the proportion of households in the sector increased 
from 12/6 in 1945 to 18% in 1951. The quality of this housing was good 
because it was built to the relatively high standards laid down by the 
Dudley Report.
By 1952 the subsidy had again been raised and completions were running 
at over 200,000 per year. This phase of expansion ran from 1951 until 1953 
when there was a period of policy reformation, typified by the 1953 White 
Paper Houses: The Next Step. New housebuilding for general needs was, in 
large measure, to be the preserve of the private sector, while total LA 
output was to be controlled so that it made up the shortfall of private 
enterprise activity below the stated target of 300,000.
During the 1950s there was an emphasis on large scale housing renewal 
by means of clearance. Redevelopment densities were high, resulting in an 
increased proportion of flats. The only sector of general needs for which 
the housing authorities were encouraged to build was the elderly, and by 
the end of 1956 no subsidies at all were available for any other general 
needs construction. This strategy was implemented throughout the period 
from 1956 to 1961.
By the 1960s the quality of new council housing was low. As funds 
were turned off, the LAs responded by reducing space standards. Subsidies 
to high rise blocks led to almost 4056 of new building being flats of five 
storeys or more during 1961-64. High rise was thought to be cheaper,
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quicker and labour saving: in fact it turned out to be unpopular, socially 
undesirable, more expensive and even dangerous.
The 1961 and 1964 Housing Acts attempted to stimulate the formation of 
the old-style housing associations. These were intended to provide 
unsubsidised accommodation for those who could not or did not wish to 
become owner-occupiers. The corollary was that council housing should be 
restricted to those sections of the population forced by financial 
circumstances to rely on it. 'Realistic rents' were introduced to drive 
the affluent worker from the council sector into the private market.
When Labour came to power in 1964 they carried on with the building 
programme and their policy of spreading the benefits of owner-oppucation to 
as many groups as possible: the expansion of council building was only seen 
as a short term necessity. By 1968 the Government was beginning to retreat 
from redevelopment and turning to rehabilitation. Slum clearance peaked in 
1971 with 87,000 units demolished and by 1976 the number had been cut to
51,000 (Merrett, 1979, p.261). This was accompanied by a huge fall in the 
number of LA starts: they declined at an average annual compound rate of 
12% in the six years after 1967.
From 1970 onwards there appears to have been a convergence in thinking 
between the major political parties concerning the broad outlines of their 
housing aims although they have, of course, differed in the specifics of 
the policies. For both parties owner-occupation is seen as a positive 
thing, something to be extended and encouraged. The public sector, on the 
other hand has been seen as a peripheral tenure category, important only 
for housing those who cannot afford to buy their way into the private 
market.
Some writers would argue that public housing is now in crisis and is
6
about to enter a period of sustained decline (English, 1982). They would 
cite a number of significant changes in policy, such as the reduction in 
the actual size of the public sector stock, caused by council house sales, 
a minimal rate of new building, a decline in the quality of new and 
existing dwellings and a reduction in the subsidy for public housing but 
not owner-occupation. Such a combination of developments has not occurred 
in the past and is seen to mark a new, residualised role for the public 
sector.
Unfortunately there is not space here to examine these arguments in 
detail. We will restrict ourselves to a brief discussion of how these 
developments have affected the public sector in the Glasgow context.
There does appear to be a declining rate of new building. Figures for 
Glasgow District are unavailable, but in Strathclyde Region as a whole, new 
starts have declined from 5,000 in 1976 to just over 1,900 in 1979. In 
1984 only 320 new houses were started and these were mostly for special 
needs groups such as sheltered units for the elderly.
However, the right to buy legislation has had little effect on the 
overall numbers of dwellings in Glasgow - only 3,548 houses have been sold 
since April 1979, 2.04% of the original stock. More details of this are 
given in Chapter 4.
It therefore seems difficult to argue that the public sector in 
Glasgow is becoming residualised at least in terms of absolute numbers: it 
is still, at 57.1% of housing stock, the majority tenure in the city.
The aspects of this line of argument that could be applied to the 
Glasgow situation are the declining quality of existing stock and the 
decline in subsidy. These two problems have reinforced each other to 
create the so-called crisis in LA housing in the City. This situation will
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be described in detail in Chapter 3.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline briefly the way in 
which the different tenures have developed since the Second World War. We 
have particularly focussed on the claims that public sector housing is now 
in crisis and have mentioned how the arguments involved might apply to the 
Glasgow situation. We will go on to develop some of these points more 
fully in subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO 
DIFFICULT-TO-LET ESTATES
PREFACE
The problems of DTL estates can only be understood in the context of 
the dominating motivation behind the provision of public housing since the 
Second World War which was outlined in the last chapter. The preoccupation 
with slum clearance and redevelopment, and the drive to overcome shortage 
by faster production has created a number of problems. These are seen most 
clearly and at their most extreme, but by no means exclusively, on DTL 
estates.
This chapter discusses DTL estates, their background, characterising 
factors and some fundamental causes. It then goes on to examine the 
problems and methods of tackling DTL housing and reviews some of the 
significant reports in this field: both Scottish and English influences. 
Finally some examples of remedial action are given and conclusions are 
drawn about future policies.
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DTL: BACKGROUND AND DEFINITION
The term 'DTL* first made its debut in press reports towards the end 
of the 1960s following the Ronan Point disaster. It resulted from the 
unprecedented situation of local authorities having to advertise houses in 
less popular areas. The term now has much broader application, covering 
estates which are generally unpopular. However, it can be misleading if 
interpreted literally - not all such estates have large numbers of unfilled 
vacancies, but they are unacceptable to applicants at the top of the 
waiting list, or to those with high priority for transfer. They may be 
easy to let, but only to households in need of immediate rehousing who 
cannot afford to wait for a better offer.
The term DTL generally reflects a housing management view of such 
estates. They would perhaps be better termed difficult to live in1.
Several other terms are used to describe DTL etates. These include 
'residual' estates, mutliply deprived areas, ghetto estates and problem 
estates.
The term 'residual' or 'sink' estates relates to the upward filtering 
process that occurs within the local authority housing market.
'Multiple deprivation' is a term that through over use has lost any 
precise meaning. It is a shorthand term to cover a range of conditions 
(physical, economic and social) which are regarded as deficient or 
undesirable. In areas of multiple deprivation several types of deprivation 
appear to cluster and reinforce each other.
'Ghetto estate* has been used by some CDP teams and carries with it 
the connotation of involuntary designation and stigma. However, this term 
can be misleading in one respect; people cannot leave a ghetto, but 
turnover of tenants is very high in DTL neighbourhoods.
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The term problem estate* is itself not without difficulty. It 
suggests a number of possible meanings, such as the estate is a problem to 
the local authority, the inhabitants of the area have problems or even that 
they are themselves problems.
CHARACTERISING DTL ESTATES
One of the most common characteristics of DTL estates is a higher than 
average local rate of tenancy turnover and applications to transfer out. 
Because such estates are unpopular, they are generally only acceptable to 
those applicants in urgent need. Thus vacancies are increasingly filled by 
households with problems - the homeless, single parents, the unemployed 
etc. 'DTL* is therefore a description of the process whereby certain areas 
accumulate a concentration of households on low incomes with related social 
problems. This tendency for those in the greatest need to end up in the 
least desirable areas has been called fsocial polarisation* or 
stratification.
How does this *social polarisation* occur? Its basic cause is linked
to the changes that have occurred in patterns of supply and demand for
public housing.
In most areas there is still a greater choice within the sector, 
arising from the increase that has taken place over the last 20 years, both 
in the size of the stock and in the range of housing within it.
Changes in demand have resulted from the shrinkage of the private 
rented sector (described in the last chapter) and the growing pressures on 
allocation policies. These include a shift by existing tenants into the 
better stock and in many areas an urgent demand for housing from such
groups as the homeless and single people.
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There have always been variations in the popularity of estates, but 
these have become more obvious where there is greater choice for some 
groups, as those with greater bargaining power move into the better 
housing, leaving those in greatest need to take up lettings in the least 
popular areas.
Until recently many housing authorities graded applicants on such 
factors as cleanliness, quality of household posessions, etc., with the 
fbestT tenants being allocated the most desirable housing. Some allocation 
policies have also used certain estates as repositories for problem' 
families which has increased social polarisation. However, allocation by 
the ability to wait rather than by any criteria of need appears to have 
greater influence in the development of DTL estates. As Wilson and 
Burbidge (1978) comment Mno-one will accept a letting unless it represents 
an improvement on his or her previous housing".
WHY DO CERTAIN ESTATES BECOME DTL?
This process of social polarisation is obviously influenced by the 
desirability of different areas and house types. What factors affect 
housing choice and the acceptability of different estates within the local 
authority market?
Obviously factors intrinsic to certain forms of housing are an 
important cause of unpopularity. However, in some estates, social factors 
can be equally important.
THE ROLE OF STIGMA
A major problem for many residents of DTL estates is the social stigma 
attached to the area. It has been alleged that this can affect their
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eligibility for job interviews and credit facilities but of course such 
discrimination is notoriously difficult to prove.
On some older estates the development of a bad reputation can be 
traced back to specific historical factors. For example, Damer(1974) in 
his study of a 1930s rehousing scheme in Govan, Glasgow, shows how the 
rehousing of slum dwellers from the Gorbals led to the estate becoming 
stigmatised by the residents of the surrounding area who resented 
Outsiders1 getting the new houses.
In some more recent estates fdeviancy amplification1 has occurred when 
certain anti-social incidents on an estate have become widely known 
through the press. In Easterhouse, for example, a poor reputation thus 
gained was rapidly extended to the wider population.
Gill (1977) makes three important points about the development of bad 
reputations.
Firstly, they are a product of external definers rather than of the 
indigenous population. Most 'insiders1 accurately perceive any deviant 
activity to be that of only a small proportion of residents. However, some 
may believe the reputation is justified and wish to leave.
Secondly, neighbourhood identities, once developed, are unlikely to 
change. A straightforward external stereotype can be maintained which 
cannot take account of the continuing diversity and change within a 
neighbourhood.
Thirdly, the more powerful the barriers between the area and the wider 
community, the stronger the externally imposed identity will be. These 
barriers can be physical, such as a railway line or an area of industrial 
land, or social, such as a different economic position or religion.
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Many reports have produced lists of characterising factors similar to 
the one below. It is not intended to be exhaustive, merely to indicate the 
range of problems involved. In most estates it is a combination of 
factors, not one on its own, which leads to decline.
These problems must be seen as characterising factors and not 
straightforward causes - some mentioned, such as a lack of community 
spirit, are more often symptoms than causes.
General factors:
- peripheral location - high cost environment
- poor physical environment
- isolation: often separated from other housing by transport routes or
industrial zones
- size: large, inhuman scale, high density
- uniformity: single tenure, i.e. public rented
single house type, e.g. large family dwelling 
repetitive in appearance.
Problems within dwelling
- condensation or water penetration
- noise penetration
- unpopular design
- outdated fittings
- expensive to heat
- small rooms.
Problems outside dwelling
- impersonal public spaces, poorly maintained and neglected
- lack of play facilities for children
- lack of community facilities, e.g. social, health
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- lack of shopping facilities
- lack of car parking space.
Management problems
- insufficient caretaking
- insufficient management, no local presence on estate
- insufficient repair service - long delays.
Social factors. Generally a high level of deprivation, including:
- high proportion of children and large families
- high proportion of single parent families
- high rates of unemployment and families on low incomes
- large social work caseloads
- overcrowding
- fear of crime
- lack of community spirit and social controls
- high level of rent arrears and turnover rates.
Many of these social problems mentioned are a function of the 
concentration of many groups in need in one area. Many are inter-related 
and often interact; for example, high rates of vandalism are linked to 
other problems, such as high vacancy rates, large numbers of children and 
few leisure facilities. Building large blocks of family-type, five 
apartment flats creates high child density, while lack of defensible 
space’ encourages crime. High crime rates (actual or perceived) lead to 
high turnover rates, reducing any community spirit and social controls and 
so on.
It must also be noted that many problems, such as high levels of 
poverty and unemployment, are structural, and there is little that any 
local authority can do to make a great impact on such problems.
15
However, many of the social and physical problems which characterise 
DTL housing can be traced to such factors as the mass housing policies and 
the role of housing management, particularly allocation policies. The 
contribution of some of these factors to the development of DTL estates is 
briefly reviewed in the following section.
MASS HOUSING
Many of the physical problems of DTL estates can be traced to the 
motivation behind the provision of public housing since the Second World 
War. The preoccupation with slum clearance led to poor quality housing, 
and the drive to overcome shortage by faster production led to high 
densities and unsuitable designs.
Many metropolitan authorities, including Glasgow, resorted to high 
density ’overspill' estates on greenfield sites. Industrialised building 
systems were promoted as faster, cheaper and as a means to overcome labour 
shortages. However, the results have been large-scale developments, 
inhuman in size, repetitive in appearance and inadequately provided with 
facilities.
In addition, many system-built schemes have a number of design 
problems, such as water penetration, unpopular layouts and forms of access. 
It is clear that some systems were adopted before being sufficiently tried 
and tested, or were crudely adapted from other climates and cultures.
HOUSING MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE
Many authors have commented on the lack of influence of housing 
departments on new housing provision in some areas. The level of resources
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channelled into development at the height of the new build programme was 
not usually channelled into housing management. The results of this were 
over-stretched management and inadequate maintenance. Despite the fact 
that these problems were outlined in the late 1970s, central government 
cutbacks of local authority funding have merely exacerbated the problem.
In many areas maintenance sections are still operating little more 
than an emergency repair service with little or no time or funds for 
routine general maintenance. Delay over repairs to dwellings is one of the 
commonest causes of complaint, not only in DTL estates but throughout much 
of the public sector.
Many of the design forms on DTL estates make heavy demands on 
maintenance staff. A poor state of repair leads to vandalism, poorly 
maintained public spaces and a lack of community spirit. The most self- 
sufficient families leave, and as the reputation of the estate declines, 
only the more desparate families move in. Thus management increasingly 
takes on a negative role of chaser of rent arrears and refuser of 
transfers. Naturally this role leads to mutual hostility and distrust 
between management and tenants, a 'them and us1 sitution.
ALLOCATION POLICIES
In many areas insensitive allocation policies have contributed to the 
development of DTL estates.
Until the 1970s Glasgow Corporation's housing was divided into eight 
amenity groups, ranked roughly in order of physical attractiveness, public 
desirability and rent. Potential tenants were assessed by housing visitors 
on the basis of cleanliness, furniture and 'type of person', and allocated 
to the type of housing they 'deserved1. Such a policy merely exacerbated 
the problem by allocating those in greatest need to group eight estates,
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which soon became ghettos (Darner and Madigan, 1974).
Similar grading systems existed elsewhere, but most allocation systems 
are now operated on a points system, which takes more account of need. 
Although this is desirable, it is not sufficient in many areas where wide 
differences in quality still exist. The allocation system passively 
reflects differential demand - applicants are merely exercising choice in a 
quasi-market situation. The most important element of price is waiting 
time and the ability to pay depends on existing housing conditions.
In conclusion, it appears that many of the problems of DTL estates can 
be attributed to a combination of poor design, sometimes poor location, 
poor co-ordination between local authority departments and poor management 
and maintenance. However, many causes discussed here are found not only on 
DTL estates but are common to all public housing, although they may not 
affect them with the same severity and concentration. Some of these 
contributory factors stem from broader policies and practices which affect 
all public sector housing.
TACKLING DTL ESTATES
f /
DTL estates are not a new phenomenon: there have been unpopular 
estates in many areas for decades. What is new is the growing awareness 
that the problems found on these estates are not diminishing either in 
quantity or complexity. v St IV, y'. rr
Until the end of the 1970s there was a confidence that through capital 
spending the public sector stock would be improved. Older stock would be 
modernised or demolished and replaced with new houses. There was an 
optimism that through the spending of sufficient capital resources the 
problems associated with DTL estates would be reduced.
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However, the present economic recession and the concomitant cutbacks 
in central government spending have dispelled such optimistic ideas. New 
building has virtually ceased and modernisation programmes have been 
drastically cut back. Several District Councils in Scotland have indicated 
that on the basis of next yearTs HRA alloction they will be unable to keep 
their stock wind and watertight, let alone start any modernisation 
programmes.
Even if the money were available, there is general agreement that many 
of the expensive modernisation programmes carried out in the 1970s did not 
always give value for money. There is also a realisation of the 
limitations of tackling such schemes in isolation from wider social and 
economic considerations affecting these areas.
Many writers and reports have concluded from examining both more and 
less successful strategies that what is required is a combined approach. 
This involves several key constituents:
- problems must be identified accurately and comprehensively;
- measures selected must be combined to form a strategy, not put 
forward piecemeal;
- the involvement of tenants at all stages;
- measures must be co-ordinated and followed up;
- the outcome should be monitored, to guide adjustments.
THE COMBINED APPROACH 
Identifying Problems
Since there is rarely any single cause for an estate becoming DTL, it 
follows that a number of solutions will be needed. The nature and causes 
of problems once discovered should be acted on quickly as the downward 
spiral, once started, is difficult to halt. It is important that the
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various departments involved work together so that problems are accurately 
defined. Also, tenants, councillors and workers in voluntary agencies 
should be fully involved.
Selecting Measures
Having defined the problems, the next step is to assemble a package of 
remedial measures. It is vital that these measures fully reflect 
priorities of residents and that they be co-ordinated so as to reinforce 
each other and make maximum impact. A housing officer in a local area 
office can assist in this by providing regular, reliable information to 
tenants.
Monitoring, Feedback and Follow-Up
Once measures have been taken it is crucial that momentum is 
maintained by effective follow-up. For example, capital spent on physical 
improvements will be wasted unless backed up by adequate management and 
maintenance. Community development efforts will need encouragement and 
support from staff. Changes in allocation and transfer policies require to 
be fully explained to tenants.
Feedback, both formal and informal, from tenants can help identify 
areas where this follow-up is lacking or insufficient.
Monitoring the effect of measures will involve analysis of data on 
lettings, transfers, maintenance and feedback from tenants. One of the 
problems can be that often goals are not clearly set out at the beginning 
of a project which makes it difficult to evaluate progress.
This combined approach has been emphasised by several key reports over 
the last decade or so. The following section briefly outlines the main 
features of some of the more signficiant reports in order to examine the 
development of different approaches to tackling DTL estates.
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SCOTTISH INFLUENCES
Council House Communities (1971) was one of the earliest reports to 
point out the poor conditions of some local authority schemes, which have 
been reduced to a condition not far removed from the slums they were 
designed to replace. In examining the possible causes for problem estates 
within post-war housing, the report points to many physical problems, such 
as the size of schemes, the predominance of three and four storey tenements 
with poor sound and thermal insulation, poor layout, poorly maintained back 
greens, inadequate refuse disposal, etc.
This report is also significant in that it reviews the contribution of 
housing policy to the development of DTL areas, particularly the way in 
which housing built under different legislation has resulted in different 
types and quality of housing. It also outlines the important role of 
allocation policies.
Finally, the report insists that the only way of improving the image 
of unpopular estates is through a comprehensive approach to social and 
physical problems. However, many local authorities did not heed this 
advice and many improvement schemes of the 1970s were characterised by a 
piecemeal approach to problems.
The Morris Committee Report, published in 1975, devotes a chapter to 
DTL estates in which it outlines the best way to tackle the problems of 
such areas. It mentions the importance of improving the ’image1 of an area 
and of positive discrimination in terms of manpower and finance. There is 
also some emphasis on community participation. It suggests that a 
programme team prepare a rehabilitation strategy in consultation with the 
community and that community leadership should be developed.
21
Following the Morris Report, the SDD set up the Urban Renewal Unit to 
assist local authorities in tackling urban deprivation. A report published 
by the URU in 1978 entitled Area-Based Policies Approach to Urban 
Deprivation set out the policies that should be adopted, based on the 
feedback and experience gained over the previous ten years. However, it 
says nothing radically different from previous reports, merely endorsing 
the comprehensive approach outlined by the Morris Committee and restating 
the importance of reviewing the problems of a particular area in the 
knowledge that they are inter-related and that no single solution is likely 
to be adequate.
Decentralisation of housing management was suggested by SDD Circular 
No. 25/1981, which recommended the appointment of a local housing manager 
for each area who would work from a local office and have a substantial 
measure of responsibility to enable a quick and flexible response to local 
needs. This suggestion has been taken up by a number of housing 
authorities, but a major problem has been defining the optimal size of each 
area. Any such area must be small enough to allow easy access for tenants 
and to encourage some sense of identification with the community while at 
the same time allowing economies of scale for the Housing Department.
The Circular is also significant in that it provides alternatives to 
demolition of unpopular housing, such as use by local authorities for 
housing or social work offices, community education, police, pre-school 
playgroups, etc. Other suggestions include a variety of different methods 
of selling unpopular housing. These include Homesteading, sale to a 
private developer to improve property for sale, joint ventures between 
local authorities and private developers to improve for sale and sale to 
sitting tenants.
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This latter sales policy has been opposed by those who argue that it 
results in the loss of the most popular housing to the private stock, which 
in the long-term will result in a gradual decline in the standard of 
housing available to council tenants. There is, however, much less 
opposition to the idea of disposing of unpopular housing, and some of the 
suggestions have been seen as acceptable alternatives by local authorities, 
regardless of their political complexion.
ENGLISH INFLUENCES
The approach to DTL estates in England (promoted by the DoE through 
the HDD) has taken a slightly different course to that of the URU in 
Scotland. Rather than seeing DTL housing as a symptom of a much more 
complex problem, the HDD has approached it as a problem which has specific 
technical and social solutions.
This approach is typified in a three-part paper entitled An 
Investigation of. Difficult-to-Let Housing which presents the main findings 
and conclusions from an investigation of 30 DTL estates by a team of 
architects and sociologists. Again this report says nothing new, merely 
giving examples of solutions which have been tried, some of which have had 
limited success.
Some of these proposed solutions have been put in to practice in the 
Priority Estates Project - a scheme set up by the DoE in 1979 to explore 
different ways that lproblemt estates might be improved. The main emphasis 
of the PEP, outlined in several reports, is on two ingredients which are 
considered vital for the success of any project. These are the tenatns* 
direct involvement in and commitment to the improvement of an estate, and 
the local authority's willingness to move operations onto the estate to 
respond to tenants* priorities and to work closely with the residents on
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very basic improvements.
It is interesting to note that in many improvement schemes there has 
been no serious attempt either to involve the tenants in the decision 
making process or to devolve management to a local level. While it is true 
that many schemes have made token gestures in this direction, usually 
tenants are merely consulted before the decisions are made and management 
decentralisation is confined to low level decision making and staff. This 
may be due to the fact that both these innovations involve radical changes 
in the structure of local authorities and can be seen to threaten the power 
of councillors and the professionalism of officers. It is much easier to 
deal with physical problems such as condensation or leaking windows. We 
will return to this theme later at the end of the chapter.
SUMMARY
It is clear from these reports that there is no easy answer to the 
problem of DTL estates. This is to be expected: the problems of such areas 
are complex, and usually no single cause can be identified, so it is 
unlikely that there will be a simple solution.
Nevertheless, there does appear to be broad agreement on the methods 
of analysing problems and approaching solutions. Most of the relevant 
reports advocate a combined approach which involves community participation 
at every stage, and a particular sequence of action. It starts with 
careful identification of problems, going on to the selection of an 
appropriate package of measures, and finally ensuring proper monitoring, 
feedback and follow-up. The overall objective is to reduce polarisation 
between estates by improving the condition, status and lettability of the 
worst.
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Clearly a substantial amount of work has been carried out on the 
problems of DTL estates and the need for remedial action. However, these 
give little guidance as to an appropriate course of action, as studies 
which have examined effectiveness have been much rarer. This is not 
surprising considering that such assessments are fraught with difficulty, 
not least because of the somewhat haphazard way in which many initiatives 
have been set up.
Consideration of the wealth of literature available leads one to the 
conclusion that generally speaking many initiatives have not been a pre­
planned response to the high level of deprivation in an area but often an 
ad hoc attempt to come to terms with purely physical problems. They have 
not always been comprehensive, they have not always assessed the impact of 
other related factors, they have not always adequately defined their 
objectives or developed a monitoring framework which would allow evaluation 
to take place.
This lack of proper evaluation means that the reader is left with a 
multiplicity of suggestions for action but little guidance as to which have 
been the more successful in a particular situation. We will return later 
to this question of evaluation.
Possible Remedial Measures
Most of the remedial measures suggested can be divided into four main 
categories: changes in management and maintenance, community development,
changes in allocation policies and physical remedies. Some examples of 
developments in each of these areas are given below.
Changes in Management and Maintenance
In many authorities changes such as the abolition of rent collectors
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or resident caretakers have led to management becoming even more 
inaccessible. Many estates are managed from busy district offices in the 
city centre. More accessible management has been achieved by, for example, 
lower staff/dwelling ratios, estate based offices, and special arrangements 
to improve co-ordination between management, maintenance, caretaking and 
lettings staff. Communication can be greatly improved by having a single, 
identifiable figure known to the residents.
In general, too little or no thought appears to have been given to 
maintenance requirements at the design stage of many post-war estates. 
Delays in repairs are a major cause of tenant dissatisfaction and much of 
the work done is corrective rather than preventative. Remedial measures 
suggested and tried have been special repairs teams, priority marking of 
repairs and planned maintenance schedules. One authority has produced 
leaflets for tenants on how to report repairs accurately.
Community Development
Many writers point to community involvement as being the key concept 
for DTL estates. As has already been shown, many of the social problems on 
estates are symptoms rather than causes, and often result from structural 
problems of high unemployment and poverty. Nevertheless, real change on an 
estate requires the active involvement of tenants at all stages.
Many community groups have achieved success despite being faced with 
massive problems. On a large deck access estate in Liverpool, 'Home Link1, 
a voluntary project for mothers and children under 5, has been effective in 
involving isolated women in a wide range of activities. In Glasgow, the 
Easterhouse Festival Society has involved the community in many self-help 
projects, including an annual arts festival.
Other activities have included the appointment of community
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of social meeting places or needed amenities, such as launderettes and play 
spaces.
Changes in Allocation Policies
Allocation policies and their unintended consequences are responsible 
for many problems found on DTL estates, especially those with high 
densities of children and concentrations of families with problems. Often 
many such families end up in forms of housing which make the greatest 
demands on their inhabitants. For example, in multi-storeys or deck-access 
housing where services and access ways are shared by large numbers of 
households, all forms of noisy or thoughtless behaviour, by children or 
adults, impinge widely on the lives of others.
Strategies tried fall into two broad groups. The first of these is 
reducing child densities, either by under-occupying dwellings, or 
allocating them to all-adult households. Case studies have shown that this 
strategy can result in reduced levels of vandalism and noise, and is 
particularly suitable for flatted estates where much family-sized 
accommodation is off the ground and there are large areas of public space. 
A second approach is to allow more flexibility in lettings, allocating 
dwellings to non-family groups such as childless couples, single people and 
students. In some metropolitan areas this policy has been particularly 
successful where there is a large potential demand from such groups who, 
traditionally, are dependent on the private rented sector. In some cases 
dwellings have been converted into smaller units, or joint tenancies 
issued.
Physical Remedies
Physical improvements are an important component of the combined
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estates, more recent estates which, because of their form or layout have 
proved unpopular, and estates with serious technical defects.
These generally take the form of modernisation of old stock, 
environmental improvement like new landscaping, the installation of more 
robust finishes where these were constantly vandalised, or the alteration 
of over-public access routes. Often these solutions are adopted because 
they are 'easy1 and a concrete statement that action is being taken. 
However, such improvements are unlikely to be effective if taken on their 
own.
As an HDD study showed (Wilson and Burbidge, 1978), physical remedies 
alone are unlikely to weaken the resolve of dissatisfied tenants to press 
for a transfer unless the tenants themselves have been consulted and 
involved in any improvements. The way in which physical modifications are 
managed and organised is particularly crucial where disruption to tenants 
is likely to occur, as with internal modernisations. Delayed programmes 
often result in anxiety and resentment as tenants are left waiting on 
seeing other parts of the estate completed. The study concluded that there 
was little point in spending capital on improvements if mangement and 
maintenance were not geared-up to provide a better service and so keep the 
level of resident morale raised. Physical improvements alone appear to be 
insufficient to arrest or reverse an estatefs decline.
SUMMARY
In this chapter we have examined the problems of DTL estates, their 
characterising factors, possible causes and remedies. We have also looked 
briefly at some of the more significant reports on these topics. It had 
been expected that each of these documents would give a divergent account
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of the issues at stake, but surprisingly, there appears to be a general 
concensus over the ways of tackling problems, particularly on the need for 
a combined approach. However, there appear to be few examples of how this 
combined approach has worked in practice.
The purpose of this review has been to bring out the problems 
associated with policies for DTL areas. Despite this broad agreement on 
the method of tackling problems, two areas of difficulty remain. The first 
of these problems is financial, the second, political.
A Financial Problem: The Question of Resources
During the 1980s the main question for debate has been who should be 
responsible for providing resources for the comprehensive approach thought 
essential for tackling DTL areas. Most LAs feel that more financial 
assistance is required from central government to carry out improvements, 
but such assistance has not been forthcoming and is unlikely to be 
available in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, many housing departments are exploring non-traditional 
sources of finance, such as banks and building societies. Several LAs have 
entered into partnership agreements with multiple builders to redevelop DTL 
areas and some examples of such schemes will be described in Chapter 4. 
For many LAs, such agreements would have been unacceptable (and probably 
unnecessary) several years ago, but in the light of recent cutbacks in 
capital expenditure enforced on them by central government, they seem the 
only way forward for DTL areas.
A Political Problem: The Question of Power
The second problem is of a political or ideological nature. It
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concerns the fact, already mentioned, that the two suggestions considered 
essential by the Priority Estates Project, namely decentralising management 
and tenant participation, have been perhaps the least applied. These ideas 
are by no means exclusive to the PEP; most recent reports have mentioned 
them in one form or another. So why have so few LAs made any serious 
attempt to put these ideas into practice?
This reluctance is often attributed to lack of resources. Certainly 
it is true that management decentralisation is expensive in terms of 
setting up new offices, employing new staff or retraining existing staff, 
etc. However, as Anne Power (1982) points out, although the 'corner shop 
approach' is more expensive than the 'supermarket approach', the hidden 
costs of the tenants' dissatisfaction and Council negligence are high too.
Perhaps a more fundamental problem is that both decentralisation and 
tenant participation involve a shift of power. In the case of area 
management, the power balance is moved from the centre to the area office, 
and to involve tenants in the decision making threatens the political power 
of elected members and the professionalism of officers.
Some LAs have made the first steps in this direction and their 
attempts have been well documented elsewhere. Jackson (1984) examined 
decentralisation in Glasgow, Newcastle and Hackney and concluded that 
although there had been some devolution of decision making and planning to 
area level, particularly within Housing Departments, the balance of power 
had not really been shifted in favour of the area.
This she attributes to the conflicting roles of the main groups 
involved in local government; the councillors, the officers and the public.
Councillors are elected to hold certain responsibilities and make 
decisions affecting an area through committees and full council meetings.
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Many councillors would argue that they were elected by loca^p^bple to 
provide local services and are therefore legally responsible for local 
government planning and expenditure. In general, members have been 
reluctant to devolve power to neighbourhood and area committees. Such 
decentralisation increases membersT area representative roles at the cost 
of conflicts between central and local loyalties.
There is also the question of members* willingness to share power with 
non-elected people. The Local Government Act restricts local involvement 
in Council sub-committees, particularly where financial matters are 
discussed. Further devolution of LA powers, which would allow the full 
development of area management functions such as resource allocation and 
policy formation, has often been blocked by councillors. In Glasgow, only 
in the Housing Department have any spending powers been devolved.
The opposition of officers is also based to some extent on an 
unwillingness to devolve powers. Locally based staff have low status and 
are usually at the lowest end of the salary scale, while flattening the 
pyramid of management hierarchy reduces the number of promoted posts in the 
centre and lessens opportunity for promotion for higher level officers. 
There may also be concerns of professionalism - a reluctance to work in 
neighbourhood offices with a mix of departments.
Tenant participation is often seen in terms of manipulation or 
placation. Cockburn*s (1977) study of local management in London was based 
on the assumption that the LA did not want to devolve power to local areas, 
but wanted to be seen to be doing something locally to placate public 
demands for improved services and greater tenant involvement. Jackson 
(1984) mentions that the problem with public involvement has come from the 
lack of it, in that there have been few outright demands for full 
participation. However, this does not seem to be the case in Glasgow,
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where many community groups, particularly in DTL areas, are keen to be 
involved in improving their area.
The Conmunity Ownership Progranme: A Solution to these Problems?
Community Ownership seems to be the next step in devolving not only 
management responsibility, but ownership to the tenants. While the tenant 
management co-operatives have, on the whole, been very successful, there 
have been questions over how much power should be delegated to the tenants. 
For example, no tenant management co-operative has as yet tackled rent 
collection although it is unclear as to whether this is the choice of the 
tenants or the DC.
However, under the new Community Ownership Programme (COP), tenants of 
each co-operative will elect a management committee from amongst their 
members and appoint their own staff. They will have responsibility for all 
aspects of management, although they may choose to pay an outside body to 
deal with some or all of these functions. Thus tenants will truly be 
involved in running their own housing.
Each co-operative will be under 400 houses, bringing management down 
to the local level. While there may be some diseconomies of scale, these 
could be overcome by the use of a secondary co-operative, to service a 
group of housing co-operatives. These issues will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter Five.
Concerning the problem of finance, the COP draws on non-traditional 
sources such as banks and building societies. Thus it seems to go at least 
some way to solving the problems inherent in former approaches to DTL 
areas, namely shortage of resources, lack of management decentralisation 
and community involvement.
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In the next chapter we will look in detail at Glasgow's housing 
problem and examine why the COP has been seen as an appropriate response to 
the problems of some DTL areas.
|
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CHAPTER THREE 
GLASGOW'S HOUSING PROBLEM
PREFACE
So far we have examined the general problems of DTL estates and how 
these are influenced by public housing policies at a national level. In 
this brief chapter we turn to the housing situation of one particular city, 
and describe the two aspects of its housing problem. These are first, the 
quality deterioration of the public sector stock and second, declining 
resources available to tackle this situation. We will see that in the face 
of this apparently insoluble problem the District Council has been forced 
to develop a new model of organisation and finance to improve public 
housing.
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THE GLASGOW CONTEXT
The scale of dereliction, urban deprivation and the past decline in 
economic activity within Glasgow is massive both in national and in 
regional terms. The extent of the concentration of deprivation can be 
measured by the fact that 67% of the worst 1% of Census Enumeration 
Districts in Scotland are located within Glasgow.
Here are some key facts which outline some of the City's problems. 
Unemployment:
Unemployment in the city as a whole is at 20.8%, significantly higher 
than the estimated comparable Scottish average of 14.4%. Male 
unemployment, at 27.2% in February 1985 is higher still and in areas such 
as Dalmarnock and Calton, half the economically active male population is 
unemployed. In ten areas of the city, over one third of the jobless have 
been unemployed for over 2 years.
Poverty:
Almost one third of the city's population are at or below 
supplementary benefit level. Over two-thirds of Council tenants receive 
housing benefit.
Deprivation:
In the ten years between 1971 and 1981, the distribution of 
deprivation has altered substantially. Traditional inner city areas of 
private housing, such as GEAR and Maryhill, which previously were extremely 
deprived, are now, due to clearance, modernisation and redevelopment of the 
housing stock, showing relative improvement.
In contrast, the incidence of deprivation has become increasingly 
concentrated in public sector housing, particularly the four peripheral 
estates of Easterhouse, Drumchapel, Castlemilk and Pollok. In these
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estates one person in three is unemployed and there is a growing 
concentration of single parent families. In Easterhouse and Drumchapel, 
between 40% and 49% of the population are children, putting stress on other 
residents and on the environment, and resulting in high rates of vandalism.
Health:
There is a strong link between inadequate housing and poor health. 
Dampness and condensation affect over 50% of the city's public sector 
stock. Deaths in the first year of life are 46.7 per 1,000 in Easterhouse 
but only 10.0 in Bishopbriggs, just outside the Glasgow boundary. The 
infant death rate in the peripheral estates is 30% above the national 
average.
Housing Stock:
The current tenure breakdown is as follows:
TABLE 1 Housing Stock, March 1985
Ua. _1_
Local Authority 170,561 57.1
SSHA 14,137 4.7
Owner-occupied 86,854 29.1
Private rented/Housing Association 26,933* 9.0
TOTAL 2Q8t485
*0f this, approximately 12,000 houses are owned
Associations.
Source: GDC Annual Housing Review 1Q84r Forthcoming.
Housing Demand:
Glasgow's estimated 'crude surplus'!! 1] has fallen from 17,997 in all 
tenures in 1981 to 16,464 in 1984. The projected 'crude surplus' and total
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voids at 1990 are lower than in 1984, confirming the picture of a 
tightening in the supply/demand for housing in Glasgow. Moreover, any 
surplus is illusory, due to normal turnover, repairs, improvement and 
clearance. Even if the DC let all its void houses, it could rehouse fewer 
than one third of all applicants on the waiting list. The number of 
households is increasing in spite of a decrease in population, mainly 
because of the increased formation of single person households.
Those rehoused in 1983 waited longer than they would have done in 
1982, despite an increase in the total number of lets becoming available 
through termination of tenancy, reduction of voids and new build. Figures 
available show an increased pressure on the housing stock, due to several 
factors.
One of the main reasons is the growth of homelessness. Between 1981 
and 1983 the percentage of total lets to homeless applicants increased from 
12% to 17% and Priority Cases under the Homeless Persons Act increased from 
2,763 to 3,107. The largest increase in homelessness is among young single 
people, many of whom end up in temporary accommodation such as bed and 
breakfast hotels.
In general, there is a growing demand for a wide range of non-family 
housing, from single person households, the disabled and the single 
elderly. Demand for two-apartment houses forms 58% of waiting list demand 
yet only 23% of total lets. However, there is still sizeable unmet demand 
for large family houses and overcrowding is a severe problem.
Thus there is a need for a comprehensive range of housing for large 
and small families, the single, the elderly, the disabled, the mentally
1. The crude surplus is the difference between the number of houses and 
the number of households before allowing for voids.
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handicapped, ex-psychiatric patients and so on. How is GDC placed to meet 
these housing needs?
Public Sector Housing Condition:
An extended period of under investment and poor planning has resulted 
in a serious deterioration of Glasgow's public sector stock. The full 
extent will not be known until the results of the Council's House Condition 
Survey are available in Autumn 1985.
However, it is known that the following improvements and repairs are 
required:
- 24,915 inter-war houses require extensive improvements to replace out­
dated fittings;
- 35,797 post-war houses require comprehensive improvement;
- an additional 41,669 houses urgently require rewiring;
- 1,645 early post-war (1945-1955) non-traditionally built houses 
require extentive modernisation;
- 24,592 post 1955 non-traditional houses require major repairs;
- all multi-storey flats over 20 years of age will soon require the 
replacement of lifts, water pumps and ventilation shafts.
Other problems include the replacement of flat roofs, asbestos 
problems, poor sound proofing of post-war tenemental stock and so on. In 
addition, over 50% of current stock is affected by damp and 148 schemes 
have been designated 'hard-to-heat' and require improved insulation and 
heating systems.
In addition the City has its areas of DTL housing, particularly in the 
four peripheral schemes, which display all the complex problems of such 
areas described in the last chapter.
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The Private Sector:
Glasgow's private sector housing, which is under 30% of the total 
housing stock, is not without its problems. The worst housing conditions 
are concentrated in the tenemental properties of the inner city, where 
14,677 houses fail to meet the tolerable standard.
The community based housing assocations have made a vital contribution 
to renewal through rehabilitation in Housing Action Areas. During 1984, 
they completed their 10,000th house but they still have another 10,000 to 
go.
Over the past two years, housing authorities throughout Britain have been 
encouraged to spend large amounts of capital in repair and improvement to 
older private housing. In 1983-84 GDC paid a total of £31.1m in 21,909 
improvement and repair grants, while work done under Section 44 Agency 
agreements amounted to £24.4m. This money appears to have been well spent. 
A study conducted by the University of Glasgow Centre for Housing Research 
(Maclennan, 1984) showed that it has created around 6,500 jobs and that 75% 
of grant value went to applicants earning below £10,000 pa.
Summary:
The purpose of this long list of facts and figures has been to show 
the extent of Glasgow's housing problem. The DC has approximately 170,000 
houses, many of which are suffering from serious disrepair, dampness and 
potentially dangerous wiring. Many are located in a poor environment and 
need to be extensively modernised. This is one aspect of Glasgow's 
problem.
Unfortunately this quality deterioration in the housing stock has not 
drawn a positive response from Central Government - indeed present
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government policy has sustained a real commitment to reduce capital 
expenditure on public housing. Thus the second aspect of the City's 
housing problem is a decline in the resources available to tackle it. It 
is to this question of finance that we now turn.
SHIFT IN RESOURCES
The current context for the public housing service in Glasgow is one 
of increasing housing needs and diminishing resources. It is clear that 
the Government wish to withdraw support from public sector housing as far
as possible and force local authorities to finance their housing service
from rent income. (In Strathclyde, only 5 of the 19 housing authorities 
still receive Housing Support Grant).
Without a ’real' increase in rent levels, i.e. above inflation, there 
will be a dramatic fall in the resources available.
Housing Revenue Account (HRA) income has fallen from £197m in 1980-81 
to £153m in 1984-85. A sharp decrease of some £13m can be expected in
1985-86. This is due to two factors:
(i) Rate Fund Contribution limits are likely to be set under new
legislation at some 1% below the 1984-85 guidelines, i.e. at £27.4m.
This is £7.6m below the RFC of £35m in 1984-85.
(ii) Housing Support Grant was reduced by around 20% in both 1983-84 and
1984-85. The proposed level for 1985-86 is £24.8m, compared to 
£52.2m in 1980-81.
These reductions in income of £13m will therefore fall entirely upon 
housing expenditure, which contains two main elements, the repairs service 
and housing management.
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TABLE 2: Housing Department Expenditure
£m
Repairs 
Lost Rents
Multi-Storey Flats (mostly caretaking) 
Housing Department (mostly staff costs) 
Central Administration 
Stair Lighting
Other (insurance, tenant co-ops, etc.)
29.75
3.65
4.85
9.84
5.37
2.02
1.68
TOTAL £57.16m
Source: GDC 1984-85 combined estimates. Excludes hostels £2.86m.
A £13m cut is equivalent to losing all Housing Department staff and 
services, or to halting the repairs services with a loss of some 900 jobs 
in Building and Works. A continuing decline in HRA can be expected over 
the next 5 years. The DCTs Housing Core Group have stated that without a 
substantial increase in capital spending it will not be possible to 
maintain all stock in a safe, wind and watertight condition. As a result, 
substantial increases can be expected over the next four years in the 
number of properties held void awaiting major repair work.
This grim picture is in contrast to the non-HRA account. The DC has 
in recent years taken advantage of the open-ended non-HRA allocation and 
has made a significant impact in the improvement of the City's private 
sector housing stock. However, fluctuations have created programming 
difficulties and the proposed cut from £80.5m in 1984-85 to a provisional 
allocation of £37.5m in 1985-86 is a severe blow to the urban renewal 
programme and to the building industry.
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that Glasgow faces massive problems of unemployment, 
poverty, deprivation and poor health. The District Council has 
approximately 170,000 houses, many of which are suffering from serious 
disrepair and are located in a poor environment. These problems will not 
go away, they are cumulative and can only become more acute and urgent. In 
addition, the City suffers from all the social problems typical of any 
urban area, although these are particularly bad in the DTL areas of the 
four peripheral estates. In the absence of adequate resources to tackle 
these problems, the Council has been forced to develop new models for 
improving its housing stock.
42
CHAPTER FOUR
A NEW RESPONSE: THE CONTEXT OF THE 
COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP PROGRAMME
PREFACE
This chapter examines the context of the development of the Community 
Ownership Programme in the light of the problems outlined in the previous 
chapter. This will enable us to see why the project is considered to be an 
appropriate way of tackling some of GlasgowTs DTL areas.
43
In the first two chapters we have looked at the problems of the public 
sector as a whole and the way in which these are particularly manifested in 
DTL areas. We have also examined some strategies for tackling DTL estates 
and the problems associated with these, particularly the shortage of 
resources and the political difficulties of management decentralisation and 
increased tenant participation.
In the last chapter we turned to Glasgow’s housing problem and 
analysed the way in which the condition of the housing stock combined with 
a decline in resources available to tackle this problem have forced Glasgow 
District Council to develop a new model for improving public sector 
housing.
Against this background, this chapter examines the influences actually 
brought to bear in shaping the Community Ownership Programme. We will see 
how the Council have drawn on the resources and experience available in the 
private sector and amongst tenants, as well as within their own structure. 
We will examine the role of partnership arrangements with the private 
sector, the District Council’s own experience of an area-based approach, 
tenant participation in public sector housing and the development of new 
forms of tenure.
Finally, some conclusions are drawn about the way in which the Council 
has used this experience in order to generate a fresh response to the 
problems of its DTL areas.
PARTNERSHIPS IN PUBLIC SECTOR HOUSING
Local authorities have traditionally not sought the active involvement 
of the private sector in developing joint initiatives in public sector 
housing. Until recently they had the physical and financial'resources
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available to undertake large scale development and redevelopment, so the 
private sector was confined to its traditional role in construction.
However, the 1980s have brought a different financial climate to 
public sector housing. In real terms the capital expenditure on local 
authority housing has reduced by 57% in the period 1974 to 1982 and local 
authorities are unlikely to be given significant additional resources in 
the foreseeable future. The pressures on the HRA have resulted in 
insufficient resources to maintain adequately many of the high maintenance 
developments built in the 1950s and 60s. Thus the dilemma facing many 
local authorities is harnessing sufficient resources to overcome design 
deficiencies by remodelling and rehabilitation, and to adjust the mix of 
tenures. In this situation, partnership arrangements between public and 
private sector are frequently beneficial.
The next section outlines the idea of Development Trusts and their 
advantages for the different groups involved, and then goes on to show how 
they can be used to tackle the problems of DTL areas.
DEVELOPMENT TRUSTS
David Rock in the Grass Roots Developers (1982) highlighted the idea 
of a Trust of interested people and organisations which could establish a 
development company to see through developments in situations where the 
public and private sectors had failed. These Developments Trusts are a 
mechanism for improving the facilities and environment of marginal areas, 
although they often focus their activity on only one site. They can take a 
variety of forms although they have a number of common organisational 
features:
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charitable status, attracting both public and private sector 
finance.
(b) To avoid the restrictions on trading which charitable status 
entails, a trading company (normally wholly owned by the Trust) is 
established.
(c) A mixture of public, private, community and special interest groups 
are represented on the Trust's Management Board.
Three main groups are involved in development trusts - local 
authorities, the private sector, and individuals and community groups. The 
concept of a trust has advantages for each of these groups, which explains 
the increasing popularity of the development trust as a mechanism for local 
initiative.
The Public Sector:
For local authorities facing huge cutbacks in capital expenditure, the 
emphasis is now on "pump-priming", using limited public sector finance to 
lever as much private sector support as possible. Many of the projects 
undertaken by trusts are, in strict economic terms, commercially non- 
viable. Public subsidy is therefore essential.
From the local authority point of view, the development trust is a 
mechanism which can attract finance to a project while still ensuring 
(through its Articles of Association) that the overall objective is for the 
public good. In this situation a local authority can provide sites or 
buildings at nominal charge.
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Most development trusts attract private sector support in two ways. 
First, support is sought on social or charitable grounds, normally as a 
donation or free services. Trusts tend to create considerable local 
publicity which is a useful spin-off! Private sector involvement also 
comes through straightforward commercial investment. The appeal of a 
development trust is that it attracts wide support, increasing the 
guarantee of a return.
Individuals and Conmunity Groups:
For individuals and community groups, a development trust ensures that 
something happens where previously both public and private sector had 
failed. There is usually some scope for community representation in the 
management structure and a feature of many development trusts has been the 
important role played by committed local residents.
John McCreadie (1984) outlines the main advantages of development 
trusts as:
(a) their ability to deal with multiple objectives - political, social 
and commercial;
(b) their ability to attract support from the widest possible range of
sources - Central and local government, charitable foundations,
private sector (donations and investment);
(c) the raising of confidence and expectations which the formation of a
trust can produce.
Development trusts come in all different shapes and sizes. For 
example, there are tourism projects, such as the Ironbridge Gorge Museum 
Trust in Telford, Shropshire, inner city projects such as the North
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Heritage, and Trusts which concentrate on the special problems of listed 
buildings, such as the Bridgegate Trust in Glasgow.
However, of the greatest interest in this context are the Development 
Trusts which have attempted to revitalise rundown properties and improve 
existing housing stock for rent or sale. One example of such a development 
trust is Stockbridge Village in Knowlsey.
Stockbridge Village Trust, Knowsley
The Cantril Farm housing estate in Knowlsey Metropolitan Borough was 
developed in the mid 1960s by Liverpool City Council to rehouse families 
from the central area slums. Properties on the estate soon became DTL and 
stood vacant, there was a high level of vandalism and unemployment and a 
lack of amenities.
Following visits by the Secretary of State for the Environment in 
1982, a team comprising Christian Salvesen (Properties) Ltd, Barratt 
Developments Ltd, and the Abbey National Building Society was established 
to explore options for improving the area. Stockbridge Village Trust was 
subsequently established in April 1983 as a private non-profit distributing 
body to:
(1) buy the estate from Knowsley MBC with mortgage loans from Abbey 
National, Barclays Bank and Knowsley MBC;
(2) manage the existing houses;
(3) supervise a programme of housing and environmental improvement;
(4) provide a new shopping area and community and sports facilities.
Most of the existing houses have been remodelled, over 700 flats and 
maisonettes have been demolished, the layout of the estate has been
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achieve a minimum owner occupation level of 50% within the estate. In 
order to encourage former local authority tenants to purchase their home, 
the trust intends to support an equity sharing scheme, whereby tenants can 
buy their home in stages, paying rent for the part not owned and a mortgage 
for the part being bought. However, those who cannot afford to buy their 
refurbished homes will be moved to other areas.
The Department of the Environment is shortly to undertake interim 
monitoring of the scheme to determine its success and whether the scheme is 
capable of replication elsewhere. At present it is difficult to gauge what 
the conclusions will be. Certainly positive change is occurring on an 
estate which was previously considered to be amongst the worst in Britain. 
However, it still does not solve the problem of providing attractive, low 
cost housing to rent for those who cannot afford, or choose not to buy 
their own home.
Nevertheless, the model of Stockbridge Village Trust has been used by 
Glasgow District Council to set up similar initiatives in Glasgow at 
Barlanark and East Woodlands.
Barlanark, Glasgow
A Community Development Trust has been proposed by GDC at Pendeen 
Crescent/Sandaig Road in Barlanark. Barlanark is a post-war housing scheme 
constructed in 1953 and lies to the south of Easterhouse. The existing 
housing form and layout comprises 506 houses in a very densely developed 
area of predominantly four-storey tenements, with little open space and no 
off-street parking facilities. Poor daylighting is experienced in several 
areas because of the high canyon effect of the housing.
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security guards, the condition of the property will deteriorate further if 
kept vacant for any length of time. Together with lost rents, the cost of 
keeping the houses vacant is estimted at £434,000 pa.
The Development trust will have the following three aims:
(a) to develop a mixed programme comprising: new build for sale and 
rent, improvement for sale and rent, shared ownership schemes, 
partial demolition, environmental improvement and provision of local 
amenities;
(b) to establish a new management structure involving new and existing 
residents, funding agencies, the District and Regional Councils and 
the Housing Corporation;
(c) to formulate a sound financial package covering the purchase of 
dwellings from the Council, an appropriate development programme, 
staffing and a continued maintenance programme.
This situation closely reflects the reasoning behind the creation of 
Stockbridge Village Trust, so it may be possible to use the experience 
gained in Knowsley as a model for use in Glasgow.
The East Woodlands Development Trust, Glasgow
East Woodlands is a mixed residential and commerical area which has 
been the subject of neglect and decay for a number of years. The area is 
characterised by small gap sites, badly decayed buildings, rubbish strewn 
streets and a high ethnic population. Despite these problems, the area has 
great potential for improvement.
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part of an extensive area of Victorian sandstone tenements and terraces 
whose high architectural and townscape quality has been recognised by the 
designation of much of it as a Conservation Area.
In the western part of the area, environmental improvements such as 
stonecleaning, backcourt upgrading and repairs have been carried out under 
grant provision, but this has been incremental and it became clear that 
some form of comprehensive action was necessary. In order to retain the 
existing community and to overcome problems of attracting finance, a 
Community Development Trust was established in February 1985. This 
comprises local residents, representatives of local businesses and members 
and officials of the District Council and will employ its own staff, 
including a full time director.
Summary
At the beginning of this section it was mentioned that there are many 
different kinds of partnership arrangements between the public and private 
sectors, although for the purposes of this paper we are confining ourselves 
to those which deal with rehabilitating public sector housing. We have so 
far discussed only one of the various models of joint public-private 
partnerships, namely development trusts. This is because at present, 
development trusts have been the only such venture set up by Glasgow 
District Council, as they are concerned with rehabilitating run-down areas 
while still retaining some housing for rent.
However, some local authorities have decided to sell areas of DTL 
housing to private developers, to produce low cost housing for sale.
51
u a x u  V/JL 11x5m  X OW UXVA^ZV* LiUXllUUI £>11 1/XQl/l XV> U V/UUIIUXX
The 23-storey block of flats, built in 1964, had become DTL by the 
late 1970s and by 1978 was completely vacant. Since they did not have the 
funds available for refurbishment, the DC realistically had two 
alternatives - demolition or sale. As the cost of demolition and the level 
of existing loan debt was considered to be too high, the block was sold to 
a private developer, with the Council receiving a share of the profit to 
liquidate its existing debt.
The flats were comprehensively refurbished with particular emphasis on 
security, and were all fully occupied 18 months after work started. They 
were sold for approximately £10,000 each, thus providing 86 low cost 
dwellings for sale at no additional cost to the Council. The eventual 
distribution of profits was 61% to the local authority, who provided loan 
guarantees and mortgage finance, and 39% to the developer.
This type of development has been considered for similar high rise 
blocks in Glasgow. Recently there was a great deal of media attention when 
the District Council turned down an offer from a private developer to buy a 
vacant block of flats, Hutchesontown ’E’, on the City’s south side. Such 
arrangements are politically unacceptable to the Council who are opposed to 
what they see as the sale of council assets.
CONCLUSION
These examples have highlighted some of the main advantages of joint 
public private partnerships. The most important elements are the wide 
range of finance utilised and the harnessing of local people’s talents and 
energies.
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creates new work, and, if the local authority owns the land and sells it 
direct, it reduces the need for development capital. For the local 
authority and housing associations, a certain part of the housing need is 
met since waiting list applicants, former council tenants and first time 
buyers are usually given priority.
As a recent article in 'Housing Reviewf[1] comments, inner city 
partnership schemes to renovate housing for sale may be advocated as 
creating a better tenure and social mix, but they cannot cure all ills. 
Booth (1982), in his report for the Housing Research Foundation, identified 
the biggest problem as funding enough nominated purchases. In the 
conclusion he makes a number of points local authorities should consider 
when undertaking such schemes.
First, be clear about the primary objective, since this will influence 
the type of venture. Second, establish demand in advance - remember local 
authorityTs traditional role is to meet need not demand, and to provide 
housing to the standard they believe to be right not down to a price. 
Finally, in the case of Community Development Trusts, it is important not 
to minimise the difficulties of reconciling the different objectives of all 
the parties involved.
The Community Ownership Programne
So what are the implications of this for community ownership?
The COP is another type of joint public-private venture, although in 
this case the dwellings will be sold to a housing co-operative formed by 
the tenants, not to a private developer. Private sector finance will be in 
the form of a mortgage, which each co-operative will raise on commercial 
terms from a bank or building society.
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The local authority will provide loan guarantees on the mortgage and 
repair and improvement grants. There will also be indirect subsidy in the 
form of one-off promotional grants and a management agency agreement. More 
details of the financial aspects of the project are given in a later 
chapter.
One major advantage of this scheme over, say, the outright sale of DTL 
housing to a private developer is that the dwellings, although lost to the 
mainstream council stock, will still provide relatively low cost housing 
for rent. Tenants will be able to transfer from the Council’s waiting list 
to a house in one of the co-operatives and tenants leaving the co-op may 
apply for a council house. Tenants of the co-op will retain their housing 
points gained for length of residence. Thus transfer between the two 
sectors will be simple.
In conclusion, we can see how GDC has drawn on the experience of 
development trusts and other joint public-private ventures to develop the 
model for community ownership. Although the Council has rejected the idea 
of sale of dwellings to a private developer for rehabilitation and sale, it 
is prepared to sell them to the tenants who will form the housing co­
operative. In this way, it gains some of the advantages of partnerships, 
such as access to private sector finance, without the disadvantage of 
losing part of the rented housing stock.
1. Housing Review, Vol.33 No. 4, July-August 1984.
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AN AREA-BASED APPROACH
Introduction
Another major influence on the development of the Community Ownership 
Programme has been Glasgowfs experience of area management. As was 
discussed in Chapter 2, management decentralisation has often been 
mentioned as an essential component of the combined approach to tackling 
DTL areas. However, many local authorities have been reluctant to put it 
into practice, due to both political and financial constraints.
The following section gives a brief outline of the area-based approach 
to local authority policy making, focussing on three particular arguments - 
meeting the diversity of needs, a co-ordinated response to local problems 
and reflecting community-defined problems and priorities. It then goes on 
to discuss developments in practice, including area initiatives and area 
management in Glasgow. Finally some conclusions are drawn about the role 
of community ownership in furthering Glasgow District Councils commitment 
to area-based management.
Development of the Area-Based Approach
It is difficult to attribute the development of an area-based approach 
to local authority policy making to the influence of a single coherent 
philosophy. Rather it can be seen as a response to a set of related ideas, 
articulated in different forms by a number of commentators on the 
operations of local government.
The central concern of most of these ideas is the notion of 
^responsiveness1, and a criticism that current policy making fails to 
respond to the needs and problems of the community. More specifically, 
local authorities have been seen as insensitive to the needs of deprived
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failure has led to an interest in the development of area management which 
is seen by Central Government as "a means of adapting local government 
organisation so that it can respond more sensitively and effectively to the 
particular needs of areas” (DoE, 1974).
As Barbara Webster (1982) comments, this concept of responsiveness is 
a rather generalised notion and contains three distinct strands of thought. 
These arguments are concerned with the diverse socio-economic character of 
different areas and the resulting diversity of needs, the need for a co­
ordinated approach to local problems and the need for policy decisions to 
reflect more closely local preferences and priorities.
1. Meeting the Diversity of Needs
Within any particular local authority, different areas or 
neighbourhoods have different social and economic characteristics such as 
population structures, industrial and employment structures, physical 
features and ethnic compositions. These differences create varying needs 
for local authority services and proponents of an area-based approach argue 
that local authorities should adjust their policies and service delivery to 
take account of them.
It has been suggested that the prevailing tendency is for local 
authorities to adopt policies which apply to the whole authority and 
provide uniform levels of service, on the principle that all areas should 
be treated alike in order to avoid any charges of discrimination. Many 
writers have put forward the idea that this tendency towards uniformity has 
been reinforced by the development of corporate planning and the emergence 
of larger governmental units. However, others feel that the problem of 
deprived areas is not that they receive the same amount of resources as
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greater need.
An area approach is believed to allow these difficulties to be 
overcome by enabling policies and resource decisions to be tailored to the 
specific needs and problems of particular localities.
2. A Co-Ordinated Response To Local Problems
It has been argued that an area-based approach would develop a more 
co-ordinated or comprehensive approach to the needs and problems of 
particular areas. Many urban problems are complex, highly inter-related 
and locality-specific, and are not amenable to the functional approach, 
funded on professional specialism. This 'comprehensive approach' was 
discussed in the last chapter.
There is another case to be made for a co-ordinated approach, based on 
the different pattern of need found in different localities. Where the 
functional perspective predominates, local authorities' services will tend 
to be based on priorities between different services, rather than on area 
priorities. If the most effective use is to be made of the resources 
available, the allocation of those resources must be considered in relation 
to the overall needs of the area.
3. Reflecting Community - Defined Problems and Priorities
As Webster (1982) comments, for some the argument for an area approach 
is not so much a question of recognising another scale of dimension in the 
policy process as a concern with the balance of influence between the local 
authority and the community in that process. It is argued that 
'responsiveness' implies reacting to local perceptions or definitions of 
needs, and local priorities for service provision.
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Local authority policy processes have been criticised for failing to 
involve the community in the decision making process. Often participation 
has occurred at the stage of formal approval of policies, rather than at 
the earlier stages of defining problems and issues and formulating possible 
policies. Planning is unusual among local authority departments in having 
a degree of public consultation enforced upon it by law, but many other 
public services, such as education and health have failed to provide 
opportunities for local preferences and priorities to be expressed.
The case for an area-based approach is, then, that it would make the 
processes of decision making and service delivery more democratic by 
allowing greater influence for community demands and priorities in the 
decisions made. The concept is of an finductive policy process1, a 
'bottom-up1 rather than a 'top-down1 process (Bennington and Skelton, 
1973).
This concept of community participation will be discussed later with 
particular reference to tenant participation in public housing.
DEVELOPMENTS IN PRACTICE
Since the mid-1960s there has been widespread experiments with new 
forms of policy focussed on neighbourhoods. These include educational 
priority areas, community development projects, the urban programme, action 
areas under the planning acts, general improvement and housing action areas 
under the housing acts, the inner area studies and the area management 
trials.
Some of these initiatives, particularly those which address themselves 
to the problems of urban deprivation, have been strongly criticised. The 
sort of objections raised are that deprivations are not as spatially
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cannot be tackled effectively by compensatory planning for particular areas 
and that the underlying political motive is to show maximum concern at 
minimum cost.
As Robin Hambleton (1978) comments, many such policies have been 
pursued with little or no understanding of the relationship between them, 
or of the way they relate to the major spending programmes, let alone the 
way they influence market forces in the private sector.
However, Hambleton argues that:
’’the spatial dimension remains important and public 
policy makers would be unwise to reject the value of 
various forms of area approach for they retain 
considerable potential for opening up fresh 
possibilities for change. First, they can promote new 
ways of learning about problems and opportunities in the 
city and the efficacy of current policies. They can cut 
across functional patterns of thinking. Second, they 
can bring important new perspectives to bear on the 
combination of processes which coalesce to give rise to 
our most serious problems of urban deprivation. Third, 
they can, by relating policies to areas which are 
meaningful to local residents, assist in the renovation 
of management and political processes at the local 
level.” (Hambleton, 1978, p.138).
AREA INITIATIVES IN GLASGOW
During the early 1970s, a number of reports were produced which 
pointed out the serious social and environmental problems in the City’s 
peripheral housing schemes. These reports included the Linmap exercise 
carried out by the SDD in 1972 and the ’’Areas of Need” report, produced in 
the same year, which incorporated its results. Despite the emphasis on a 
comprehensive approach, almost all the proposed solutions were physical in 
nature and social problems were not really dealt with.
In February 1975 the DoE published the results obtained from work on
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data. This documented the severe problems found on Clydeside and received 
widespread publicity. In response to this, GDC identified the "Areas at 
Risk", mainly the major post-war peripheral schemes of Easterhouse, 
Drumchapel, Pollok and Castlemilk. A report from the Planning Department 
also recommended that Area Management Teams be set up to deal with the 
whole range of corporate services. In fact, the only administrative change 
that was made was the setting up of a management team to improve the 
management of services.
Throughout the mid 1970s there was increased concern regarding the 
decline in the City!s population but in fact the scale of the decline 
predicted never materialised.
In 1980 the DC introduced the "Alternative Strategy" in response to 
Central Government cutbacks in housing expenditure. This report recognised 
that some programmes and areas required intensive input of resources and 
the GEAR area, the Maryhill Corridor and the four peripheral estates were 
designated as priority areas. In addition to these areas the Council has 
used a system of categorising "stress areas" on the basis of vacancy rates, 
transfers and turnover.
There are five categories of stress, category 1 being the most 
problematic to category 5, the least problematic. 66% of council stock is 
categorised as average or above average in terms of stress (that is 
category 1, 2 or 3). 17% of all DC dwellings in the peripheral estates are
in the worst two categories.
In 1980, Special Initiatives were set up for the most problematic 
parts of the peripheral schemes - Kingsridge Cleddans (Drumchapel), 
Garthamlock and Lochend (Easterhouse), Priesthill/Nitshill (Pollok) and 
Tormusk/Scarrel (Castlemilk).
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Generally speaking, the approach in these areas was a fairly 
comprehensive one, covering improvement, conversion and restructuring of 
the housing stock, the diversification of tenure, changes in letting and a 
number of management initiatives.
Sim (1984) outlines the aims of these area-based approaches as:
(i) to halt and reverse decline;
(ii) to bring dwellings to an acceptable standard of amenity;
(iii) to afford security to all residents;
(iv) to stimulate community regeneration and development;
(v) to upgrade and maintain the environment.
The Special Initiatives have had a number of important successes and 
have, to a certain extent, made a contribution to improving problem areas 
of the city. However, notable problems have been the high level of 
vandalism of such improvements, and the large amounts of money needed. The 
attraction of community ownership is the relatively small amount of 
financial input required from the DC.
Area Management in Glasgow
Glasgow’s area management scheme was later than many others, 
implemented only after 1980. Corporate working had been introduced in 1975 
and subsequently the centralising tendencies of this re-organisation were 
recognised. The whole management structure was revised and area management 
committees (AMCs) were set up for the eight areas of the District. The 
task of these AMCs was to advise and supervise the local delivery of 
council services, and identify particular local needs and problems with the 
support of the area management teams, formed from officers of the main 
services departments of the District and Regional Councils, and other
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This area management structure was seen as a way of extending the 
area-based experiments such as GEAR. However, the areas have not really 
been allocated any real powers, other than to recommend local projects and 
comment on departmental strategies (see Jackson, 1984 and McFadden, 1982).
Decentralised Housing Management in Glasgow
In 1978 the Housing Department was re-organised to provide a 
comprehensive housing service, taking on new roles in policy planning and 
resource allocation for both public and private sectors. As part of this, 
new highly qualified professional staff were appointed and the management 
structure was decentralised to seven Districts throughout the City, each 
consisting of two adjacent Area Offices (except the Southeast District 
which has three area offices). Each Area Office has 30 to 40 staff and 
deals with such functions as rent collection, allocation, estate 
management, housing benefit and arrears. However, at present the seven 
Districts are each the size of most housing authorities before 
decentralisation, and there are long term proposals for further 
decentralisation to comprehensive neighbourhood offices at an even more 
local level.
Area Management and the Community Ownership Programme
The COP brings housing management down to the local level. Each 
housing co-operative will manage its own houses through a democratically 
elected management committee drawn from their own tenant-members. The 
committee may choose to appoint their own staff. In this way, decision 
making takes place at the neighbourhood level, of perhaps several hundred 
houses.
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However, as the experience of co-operative housing in Scandinavia has 
shown, the size of the co-operative is crucial. A balance must be created 
between having groups which are small enough to give a cohesive identity, 
and on the other hand, groups which are large enough to be financially 
materially viable.[2]
For example, if the co-operative is too small, it will be expensive to 
employ management and maintenance staff. While some services might be 
bought from a secondary co-operative, each co-operative must have its own 
caretaking staff. In Norway, it is generally recognised that around 150 
and not more than 250 dwellings is an ideal size, although the range is 
from under 100 to over 1,000 dwellings.^
In this respect, Calvay co-operative, at around 360 dwellings seems 
rather large, although the house type, four-storey tenements, means that 
they are contained in a small geographical area. On the other hand, 
Broomhouse and Ballantay, at around 100 dwellings, seem rather too small 
for effective management. At Ballantay there is the possibility of 
extending the co-operative to include other dwellings as some are improved 
and let.
Nevertheless, despite these reservations about the size of each co­
operative, the proposals for community ownership do seem to extend, albeit 
in a limited scale, Glasgow District Council's commitment to an area-based 
approach.
2. These are the same problems which face any local authority trying to 
implement area management proposals.
3. See Kintrae, K. and Munroe, M. (forthcoming) Community Ownership in 
Norway, University of Glasgow Centre for Housing Research.
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Tenant Participation
Various developments during the 1970s provided fertile conditions for 
the idea of tenant participation in housing. Some of them are described in 
a Fabian pamphlet, Can Tenants Run Housing?, Fabian Research Series 334, 
1979. Speculation in private rented property in the property boom of 1970- 
74 provoked the formation of tenants associations and resulted in some co­
operatives being formed (e.g. Fairhazel in Camden). Slow, insensitive, and 
sometimes destructive clearance activity by local authorities prompted the 
formation of tenants co-operatives for rehabilitation in Liverpool, Cardiff 
and elsewhere. The scarcity of housing for young people provoked a rebirth 
of the squatters movement which, in some cases, led to the formation of co­
ops especially in London. Finally, criticism was growing of the
insensitivity and paternalism of traditional local housing authority 
management.
This criticism of failing to involve the client has been levelled at 
many areas of local authority service provision. Blunkett and Green (1983) 
argue that local authorities are currently failing to attract mass support 
for the services they provide, whether they be housing, welfare, education, 
recreation or transport. This they attribute to the style of delivery:
"we have not provided services with people, we have 
provided them for people. Therefore our commitment has 
been to some sort of paternalistic socialism when we say
'Give us a chance and we will do it for you’.. we end
up being defensive. We are defensive about the role of 
tenants in housing, defensive about the role of parents 
and teachers, and defensive about the role of so-called 
'clients1. Central and local government services end up 
being something given to people out of the goodness of 
our hearts and not something they are participating in 
and feel to be theirs "
In many cases, council housing has been administered by officials 
whose paternalistic attitudes are reminiscent of the nineteenth century.
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self-confident communities which council housing now serves. In many 
cases, tenants have no say over the form or allocation of benefits and 
services. As Colin Ward (1974) comments:
,Tthe landlord-tenant relationship has never been a happy 
one. In Britain, it has always been accompanied by 
mutual suspicion, to which, when housing was conceived 
as a public service rather than as a source of profit, 
was added the syndrome of dependency and resentment that 
characterises the council estate.”
One way in which local authorities have encouraged tenant 
participation is through tenant management co-operatives, where the public 
landlord retains ownership of the property, but management (in part or in 
whole) is devolved to the tenants. The role of these co-ops is examined in 
the following pages.
Tenant Management Co-Ops
Tenant management co-ops are one way in which local authorities have 
responded to the varying problems inherent in both their stock and their 
relationship with tenants.
All but one of Scotland’s co-ops are management co-ops. In England, 
in contrast, par-value co-ops greatly exceed management co-ops in number. 
Both types of co-ops are particularly concentrated in London, the South 
East, Liverpool and the Northeast.
There are eight publicly funded housing co-ops in Scotland, one in 
Edinburgh and seven in Glasgow. The Summerston co-op of 247 houses was set 
up in 1976-77. The houses are owned by the District Council but most of 
the management is carried out by the co-op. A similar but smaller co­
operative of 63 houses - the Fairbridge co-op - was established by the SSHA 
in late 1978. The 200 tenants of Speirs co-op in Yoker managed the
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modernisation of their houses. Another two co-ops have been set up in 
Summerston, adjacent to the first, while the two newest co-ops have been 
set up in the east end of Glasgow, Whiterose and Claythorn.
The Housing Co-operatives Review Committee, in its 1983 report on 
Housing Co-operatives in Scotland concludes that the variety of co-ops 
demonstrates that housing co-ops can be set up successsfully in old and new 
housing, in flats and houses with gardens, in inner city and suburban 
locations, in very small and very large units, and in conventional and 
unusual architectural forms. They have tackled a range of housing tasks: 
rehabilitation and modernisation of older property, letting of unpopular 
housing, maintenance and repairs, neighbour disputes and environmental 
improvements, mostly with outstanding success.
It has been argued that co-ops give the tenant control over his 
housing environment, without the feeling of a paternalistic (perhaps 
benign, perhaps neglectful) landlord who makes the regulations. The more 
tangible benefits can include reduced vandalism, quicker repairs and a 
better environment.
Collette Morton (1984), in her study of the tenants in Summerston, 
shows that these advantages are seen as the major benefit of living in a 
co-op. For the majority of respondents in her survey, tenant participation 
was not seen as an end in itself, rather tenants felt that such attributes 
as a community spirit and a better environment are likely to be associated 
with Community living1. The tenants in her survey also expressed a high 
degree of satisfaction with the existing opportunities to let views be 
known, and also in terms of the management committee being in touch with 
people's needs. Among tenants as a whole there was an enthusiasm for a 
system of housing management based on self-determination, participation and 
co-operation. Despite the problems, tenants recognised that they shape
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policies and decisions.
Promoting Tenant-Management Co-Operatives
Nevertheless, despite these successes, it must be recognised that 
several other proposed tenant management co-ops have failed to get off the 
ground. Sometimes there has been real scepticism on the part of the 
tenants, despite the enthusiasm of the landlord. Sometimes councils have 
very entrenched views regarding the management of ’their’ housing stock, 
and often officers and members are worried about decreased influence. Some 
are genuinely concerned about the practical problems that can arise. For 
example, if tenants allocate some, or all, the relets, what will happen to 
racial minority groups, ex-offenders, ex-mental patients, the alcoholics, 
etc.
However, many housing authorities appear uninterested in the 
possibilities of tenant management co-ops. The Housing Co-operatives 
Review Committee wrote to all the housing authorities in Scotland and 
received only 32 replies, of which 11 had rejected the idea of tenant- 
management co-ops in principle and six were still thinking about it. This 
shows great reluctance on the part of housing authorities to accept any 
innovation.
As Goodlad and Popplewell (1982) comment, the evidence of the 
established co-ops and less fruitful ventures clearly demonstrates that co­
ops do not just happen - there is a need for a commitment to the ideas of 
tenant participation and control to be expressed in practical assistance. 
Both GDC and the SSHA have employed staff to promote and develop co-ops.
The Housing Co-operatives Review Committee note that there is a 
prevelance of the idea that the initiative to set up a co-op should come
heard of the idea and do not know of the potential benefits. The criticism 
that the idea did not originate with the tenants has been levelled at both 
tenant-management co-ops and par-value co-ops by the Glasgow Tenants 
Federation, noted in an article in The Guardian in September 1984. This 
view provides an ideal excuse for housing authorities to argue that since 
no tenants group has come forward wishing to set up a co-op, there is 
obviously no interest from the tenants.
Recognising the lack of widespread adoption of the idea of tenant 
management co-op, the SDD issued a circular to encourage the promotion of 
pilot co-ops (Tenant Participation .and. Housing Co-operatives, SDD, 1977). 
This circular recognised the highly centralised system of housing 
management in the public sector and urged that substantial efforts be made 
to encourage tenant participation.
Four important benefits of this were envisaged:
(i) Giving tenants a greater individual satisfaction through having the 
opportunity to exercise real control over their living conditions.
(ii) Developing a stronger sense of concern for the local community and 
reducing social isolation.
(iii) Bringing more personal initiative and resources into housing 
management, and, in the long run, providing for more effective use 
of management resources.
(iv) Providing, in effect, an alternative form of tenure to the virtually 
straight choice which now exists in Scotland between owner- 
occupation and renting from a public authority.
(This latter point will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section).
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In discussing tenant participation, it seems relevant to ask how much 
control tenants in tenant-management co-operatives really have? Is their 
power illusory and do the public landlords retain effective control?
To give effective control to tenants, real budgetary and management 
powers must be devolved to them. England has evolved much further than 
Scotland in the degree of delegation. In London, tenants are responsible 
for the entire gamut of management functions such as repairs and 
maintenance, management, lettings, rent collection and insurance. This is 
much less true in Scotland where, for instance, none of the management co­
operatives has tackled rent collection. The English co-operatives are also 
paid a much higher cost per house for management - £420 per house, 
contrasted with £210 in Glasgow.
All Scotland's tenant-management co-ops carry out a broadly similar 
range of tasks. Only one has carried out a major capital project, and no 
co-ops have been set up to carry out only one or two functions. Only one 
local authority and the SSHA have entered into agreements with tenant 
management co-ops: no new town development corporations and no housing 
associations.
While most tenant-management co-ops have been very successful, there 
have been problems over the degree of responsibility delegated to tenants. 
The logical conclusion is to give the tenants total control, that is 
ownership of their homes.
New Forms of Tenure
Tenant management co-operatives have clearly increased tenant 
participation and can, in a way, be seen as an alternative form of tenure.
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in Britain, have also been seen as an alternative form of tenure. This 
'third arm' concept refers to the role of housing associations in 
supplementing and complementing the housing provision of, firstly, local 
authorities and Central Government agencies which together constitute the 
statutory 'arm' of housing, and, secondly, the private sector. However, 
this view of housing associations as a "quasi-private" sector of the 
housing market is debateable, since most are funded entirely by central 
government, via Housing Association Grant (HAG) and Revenue Deficit Grant 
(RDG).
Certainly housing associations in Glasgow have involved tenants in 
management and have contributed greatly to inner city renewal, renovating 
or building over 10,000 houses. However, not one of the Glasgow community 
based housing associations has yet set up a tenant management co-op.
In Glasgow, two different schemes have attempted to diversify tenure 
by bringing owner-occupation within the reach of lower income households. 
The first of these, Homesteading, was an innovative scheme set up by the 
District Council. The second, council house sales, was enforced by Central 
Government and is politically unacceptable to the Labour controlled GDC.
Homesteading
One innovative scheme which attempted to diversify tenure in one of 
Glasgow's peripheral schemes was Homesteading. This was introduced in 
January 1981 as a small part of the overall strategy to reverse the outflow 
of tenants from Easterhouse. At that time, the estate comprised 15,000 
houses, all in public ownership, many of which were DTL and some derelict.
Homesteading in Glasgow differs from schemes already established 
elsewhere, in that the DC carried out the necessary envelope repair work
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before the flats were sold at discount prices to people already on the 
councils waiting list. The flats were sold on condition that purchasers 
carried out specified repairs within certain time limits. Loans were made 
available for house purchase, together with a topping up loan to enable the 
homesteader to finance his or her share of the internal work. Improvement 
grants were also available towards such work.
Mortgage payments were deferred for a period of one year from the date 
of entry. If a homesteader sells the property within five years, he or she 
must repay a proportion of the discount to the Council.
Due to the popularity of this project, the initial scheme was expanded 
to include a further 162 flats in the Easterhouse area and 47 flats in 
traditional sandstone tenemental property in Shettleston.
GDC undertook a survey of homesteaders in October 1981, not long after 
the project had started. It appears to be a success by various measures. 
Most of the homesteaders had been local authority tenants previously and 
60% had been living in Easterhouse itself or the surrounding eastern area 
of the City. To a certain extent the project has met housing need - 
purchase had enabled a number of families to improve their physical housing 
conditions to the extent that 11 families who did not have sole use of 
basic amenities now have so, and 14 families who had previously been living 
in overcrowded conditions now live in accommodation of adequate size.
Homesteading also apears to have met housing preferences in that it 
allowed families who wished to own their own home and would probably not 
have been able to do so on account of low income, to realise their 
ambition.
The general level of satisfaction among the homesteaders was good. 
This was illustrated by the fact that the majority were willing to
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recommend the scheme to others, and they believed that they would have no 
trouble selling their property when they wished to move.
Financially, the scheme seems to be a viable option for GDC - it cost 
less than the other three alternatives for the houses involved - 
demolition, refurbishment by the DC, or an agreement with a private 
developer.
However, Homesteading was politically unacceptable to the majority of 
members on the Labour controlled DC. Their 1984 Manifesto came out 
strongly against the sale of Council assets, even though it could be argued 
that vacant houses which cannot be let are no asset. Nevertheless, 
Homesteading, despite its successes, is clearly not a solution to the 
problem of DTL housing.
The majority of dwellings in such areas are occupied and therefore 
cannot be sold, except to the sitting tenants, many of whom cannot afford 
or do not wish to purchase their home. The advantage of community 
ownership is that it gives many of the benefits of owner-occupation such as 
control over one’s environment and an element of self-determination, 
without the individual responsibility for repairs and maintenance.
Council House Sales
Under the provisions of the Tenants’ Rights Etc. (Scotland) Act 1980, 
local authority tenants have the right to buy their council house if they 
have at least two years continuous tenancy. Despite attractive discounts 
of up to 60%, this scheme has not been a success in Glasgow, in that a very 
small proportion of tenants have taken up the opportunity to purchase their 
council house.
At present, Glasgow has the sixth lowest proportion of council house
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sales of any Scottish local authority. At March 1985, Glasgow had sold or 
finalised missives for 3,548 houses since April 1979, 2.04# of original 
stock. This compares to 3.1# in Aberdeen, 4.9# in Edinburgh, 0.8# in 
Dundee and 1.2# in Motherwell.
The average time from an application to buy to a sale is 7.4 months, 
and 80# are sold in 9 months or less. Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee, Argyll 
and Bute, Banff and Buchan, Clydebank, Dumbarton, Falkirk, Gordon, 
Midlothian, Monklands, Renfrew, Shetlands, Stirling and Western Isles are 
all averaging more than 12 months in processing council house sales 
applications.
Analysis of the first 1,000 houses sold has shown that the most 
popular areas of the city, such as Anniesland and Mosspark, which are 
inter-war cottage estates, have been the most popular with purchasers. 29# 
of properties purchased have been in Anniesland and 17.3# in Mosspark, 
whereas only 0.6# and 0.3# are in the peripheral schemes of Castlemilk and 
Easterhouse respectively.
The majority (74.9#) of properties sold have been semi-detached or 
terraced, making a loss of 2.8# of the total stock of these house types 
which make up 15.1# of the City's stock. The house types which are in 
shorter supply, such as these and four-in-a-block, are being purchased most 
frequently.
Almost half (49.4#) of dwellings sold have been four apartments, 37.6# 
three apartments and 13# five apartments. A high proportion of the Cityfs 
stock of larger houses has been sold. If this trend continued, the supply 
of an already scarce house size will diminish.
The average valuation price of the first 1,000 properties sold ws 
£17,728, but the average selling price was only £9,469 - a negligible sum
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compared to the average new build cost of £32,000.
Therefore, it is the more desirable house types in the more popular 
areas which are being purchased. The DC is losing its most sought after 
housing stock and is not receiving sufficient cash from sales to replace 
it. This result of sales was predicted by many writers who have argued 
against council house sales.
In Glasgow, the DC believe that selling council houses is in conflict 
with the basic social objective of helping people obtain minimum standard 
housing that they could not afford in the open market. As there are still 
large numbers of people poorly housed and on the waiting list, to dispose 
of part of the public housing stock before meeting the basic housing need 
of these people seems to constitute an abandonment of one of the basic 
functions of government.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this review of past initiatives has been to show how 
the DC have drawn on their experience to develop the model for community 
ownership. These are the roots from which the scheme has grown.
In summary, the COP draws on the financial advantages to be gained 
from establishing a joint public-private venture, without losing the houses 
to the rented stock as would happen if they were sold to either a private 
developer or the sitting tenant. The project will focus resources on 
particularly deprived areas and will hopefully tackle^ a number of social 
problems as well as the physical problems of disrepair. In addition, it 
requires a smaller amount of capital expenditure than some other extensive 
improvement programmes and after the two year development period, there 
will be no recurring revenue expenditure.
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Finally, the project should bring management down to the neighbourhood 
level of a few hundred houses and give some of the advantages of owner- 
occupation without the individual responsibility for repairs and 
maintenance. In the next chapter we will examine the model in more detail.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP PROGRAMME:
THE MODEL
PREFACE
We saw in the last chapter how a new response to one of Glasgow's 
housing problems had arisen, drawing on the experience of past initiatives. 
In particular we considered the influence of joint public-private ventures, 
tenant initiatives, new forms of tenure and the development of an area- 
based approach to housing management. This chapter discusses the Community 
Ownership Programme in detail, outlining how the idea emerged and 
describing how the model will work. The purpose of this is to set the 
scene for the pilot study areas described in the next chapter. It is also 
important to outline how the project was set up, as this information is 
unavailable elsewhere .
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GLASGOW’S COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP PROJECT
INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to attribute the idea of setting up par-value co-ops 
in Glasgow to any one individual. Rather the idea seems to have evolved 
from discussions between various groups, including consultants, tenants and 
the District Council.
In early 1983, a group of tenants from Calvay Crescent in Barlanark 
approached the District Housing Manager to express dissatisfaction with 
their area, especially the environment and the condition of the housing. 
When told that the area was scheduled for improvement in 1991, the tenants 
asked the DC to explore other, quicker, ways of funding an improvement 
programme.
Discussions between the DC, consultants McGurn, Logan & Duncan, and 
various key officers and politicians continued throughout 1983. By 
Christmas of that year, the DC seconded Iain Nicolson, a District Housing 
Manager from the City South area, to investigate further the possibilities 
of community ownership. The City South area of Glasgow contains 63,000 
private sector houses, by far the largest number of any area within the 
city. It also has a number of community based housing associations and 
consequently Mr. Nicolson has had considerable involvement in community 
projects.
In January 1984 an interim report was presented to the Housing Core 
Group of the DC, which resulted in recommendations for further consultation 
with a number of tenants1 groups. By March 1984, 14 groups had been 
identified and four areas - Ballantay (Castlemilk), Calvay (Barlanark), 
Broomhouse and Wellshot (Cambuslang) - were selected for feasibility
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These four areas were chosen to represent different house types and 
different socio-economic backgrounds. In turn this would lead to variation 
in the valuations and the amount of improvement grant needed. It was hoped 
that this would show that a standard model for the COP could be applied in 
any area.
By July 1984, Wellshot had withdrawn from the scheme and a number of 
other tenants groups, notably Priesthill Traditional Action Group, the 
Southdeen Action Group and the Possil Steering Committee were keen to take 
their place. However, the DC decided to go ahead with the three pilot 
schemes and feasibility studies were presented to the Council in Novembr 
1984. These were approved on 13th December 1984.
At present (April 1985) the Council are still awaiting aproval from 
the Scottish Office, but this is expected to be given later this month. It 
is also expected that a special allocation of funds will be made available 
for the COP.
HOUSING CO-OPERATIVES
There are three main types of housing co-operative. These are as 
follows:
- local authority (housing association, new town or other public 
landlord) owned tenant management co-operatives, where ownership is 
retained by the public landlord but management (in part or in whole) 
is devolved to the tenants co-operative;
- equity sharing co-operatives in which members have an individual share 
(or equity) in the property and subsequently benefit from the
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appreciation in value when they leave;
- par-value co-operatives, where the members collectively own the houses
but have no individual share in the equity.
For the purpose of this study the second type, equity sharing co­
operatives, have been disregarded. The fundamental difference between the 
other two types is that a management co-operative is specifically what it 
states: it is about collective management of the houses. A par-value co-op 
is, in addition, the collective owner of the houses.
PAR-VALUE HOUSING CO-OPERATIVES
Most par-value co-operatives are fully mutual, that is, all the 
members are residents or prospective residents, and all the residents are 
members. The reason for this will be more fully explained later. In a 
fully mutual co-operative, par-value is where neither the members1 right to 
occupy the property nor their share in the co-operative is an asset which 
they can dispose of for value. The tenant-members collectively own their 
houses, but have no stake in the increasing value of the property. They 
contribute a nominal sum for membership, usually £1, but receive no 
individual capital gain when they leave.
The co-operative, like a housing association, employs its own staff, 
who are usually supervised by a democratically elected management 
committee. It is possible for a co-op to be managed by a general meeting 
of all its members, but this is usually thought to be unpracticable for two 
reasons. First, the large numbers of people involved would usually make 
meetings either unwieldy or inquorate. Second, this would preclude any 
tenant-member of the co-operative being employed by the co-operative in any 
capacity. Thus the co-operative could not, for example, employ one of 
their residents as caretaker.
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The rights of both committee and members are outlined in the co­
operative's constitution, approved by the Scottish Federation of Housing 
Associations and registered with the Registrar of Friendly Societies and 
the Housing Corporation under the provisions of the 1974 Housing (Scotland) 
Act.
A par-value co-operative is autonomous and self-sustaining. Neither 
the co-op nor its members receive any form of direct financial subsidy, 
although as we will see later, there are many forms of indirect subsidy. 
The main source of income is generated through rent.
Many of the proponants of housing co-operatives are convinced that 
housing is not just a commodity to be bought and sold, but that in some way 
a home adds to your sense of self, your identity. Co-ops allow a much 
greater participation and responsibility by tenants, which encourages both 
this vital sense of home and the development of subtle networks of mutual 
support and sharing. In this way, it has been suggested, co-ops make homes 
from mere houses, and collective, as opposed to individual ownership 
creates communities of neighbours.
However, as Jelfs (1984) comments, creating homes and communities in 
practice requires the bringing together of three things - people, buildings 
to purchase or rent, and finance to buy and repair. Many housing 
inititives have the third factor missing.
The next section outlines different aspects of these three factors - 
the membership of the co-op, the buildings and financial aspects. It also 
outlines briefly the process of setting up a par-value co-op. Most of this 
is fairly general and would apply to any other group in Scotland who wished 
to form a par-value co-op.
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MEMBERSHIP
It is essential that the co-op be fully mutual, i.e. all the members 
are residents or prospective residents and all residents are members. Co­
ops should therefore seek to adopt the model rules laid down by the 
Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (1981) or any fully mutual co­
operative.
If the co-op is not fully mutual, the following problems arise:
- tenants have security of tenure so it is difficult to obtain a 
mortgage as the property cannot be used as adequate security;
- tenants have the right to buy at statutory discount;
- the co-op will not receive tax relief on the loan interest, exemption 
from Corporation Tax on rents or exemption from tax chargeable gains 
on property.
BUILDINGS 
Valuation:
As far as the price of the property is concerned, the right to buy 
discounts do not apply. The property requires to be sold at the best price 
the DC can secure. If the Council proposes to dispose of the houses at a 
price less than that (i.e. below the City Estates Surveyor's valuation), 
the Secretary of State's consent is required.
This issue of valuation has caused many problems in Glasgow. A low 
valuation and consequently, purchase price is essentially to the financial 
viability of the proposed co-operative. However, this can be difficult if 
a tenant in the area has already purchased his home under the right to buy
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provisions or if the outstanding loan debt on the dwelling is substantial.
If the outstanding loan debt is equal to or less than the purchase 
price, the modified value is simply a transfer of the Councilfs capital 
gain on past investment. Alternatively, in many cases it is possible to 
argue that the dwellings have in fact no market value and should be 
transferred at nil cost. This case has been put forward by a tenants1 
group in Possil who feel that the poor condition of their houses makes them 
uninhabitable, and the high vacancy rates have cost the Council a great 
deal of money on security. Thus they argue that the Council will save 
money by transfering the money to the co-op at nil cost, even though there 
is still a substantial outstanding loan debt.
Transfer
The DC will transfer the subjects through negotiations with the co­
op's agents and solicitors. This transfer will be subject to mutual 
agreement by all parties as to the terms contained in the Minute of 
Agreement. A separate Agreement will exist between the DC and each co-op.
Improvement Programme
The capital improvement programme for each co-op will be met in the 
following way: the DC, under the provisions contained in Section 58 of the
Housing (Scotland) Act, 1969, as amended by Section 44 of the Housing 
(Scotland) Act, 1974 will, through contractors to be appointed by the 
Council, carry out the entire improvement and repair programme.
The advantages of this to the co-op are as follows:
1. The co-op will not be liable for VAT. This will provide a substantial 
saving.
2. The DC will be responsible for the improvement and repair contract and
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the administration of grants and payments, relieving the co-op of the 
administration.
3. The agency agreement will operate over a development period of, say, 2
years, which will give the co-op time to organise their management 
structure.
SOURCES OF FINANCE
1. Central Government
The main source of central government funding for housing co­
operatives comes from HAG through the Housing Corporation. However, it is 
not suggested that any potential co-op should apply for this, as it would 
give the Housing Corporation the following powers:
(i) to order an investigation or monitor the co-op;
(ii) dismiss the co-op management committee and appoint its own;
(iii) to close down the co-op;
(iv) to regulate its activities.
However, the Housing Corporation does have powers which would be 
useful to most par-value co-ops seeking non HAG finance. These include:
(i) to act as a source of mortgages using money raised by the 
Corporation from the Private Sector;
(ii) to act as guarantors of mortgages from private bodies.
Other areas of central government finance which should be investigated 
are Urban Aid and other financing such as the SDA's fleg-upf assistance.
Subsidy from central government also comes indirectly through tax 
relief on the co-op*s mortgage.
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2. Local Government
There are five main ways in which local authorities can assist co­
operatives with the financing of housing projects.
(i) Mortgages (Section 152, Housing [Scotland] Act, 1966)
Under this section a local authority may give grants or loans to a 
housing co-operative, if they are registered with the Housing 
Corporation. However, this option has not been taken up by GDC as 
it would result in purely a book entry in the non-HRA block - the 
Council would be providing the money to buy its own houses from 
itself. Instead, mortgage finance is to be provided by the private
sector which will realise approximately £1m in favour of the Council
and give them an additional borrowing consent in 1985-86.
(ii) Guarantees (Section 31[1], Tenants Rights Etc. [Scotland] Act 1980) 
This section permits a local authority to issue a guarantee in 
respect of the principal and interest on loans and also in respect 
of any arrears, on money borrowed elsewhere, eg. building societies. 
Thus the co-op is much more likely to get a mortgage. However, the 
Treasury regards the issuing of guarantees as a form of public 
expenditure so the local authority must obtain the prior approval of 
the SDD. If such a guarantee was called up, the Council would be 
required to buy back the dwellings from the HRA block under the pre­
emption clause contained in the Minute of Agreement. The question 
of purchase price would then cause some difficulty, as the post­
improvement houses will clearly be valued higher than the original 
purchase price paid by the co-op.
(iii) Improvement and Repair Grants (Section 1, Housing [Scotland] Act
1974)
Under this legislative provision, the co-operative can apply for
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repair, improvement and environmental improvement grants. These 
come from the DCs non-HRA block.
(iv) Section 137 Local Government (Scotland) Act, 1972
This is a general power which could cover funding to co-ops by local 
authorities. The Council has the power to "incur expenditure in the 
interests of their area or any part of it".
(v) Housing Association Grant (Housing [Scotland] Act, 1974)
HAG can be administered by a local authority, but the co-op would 
first have to register with the Housing Corporation
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3. The Private Sector
There are five main sources of funds from the private sector: building 
societies, banks, charitable trusts, insurance companies and pension funds.
Building societies are permitted to lend up to 10% of their funds as 
special advances to bodies such as housing co-operatives. These are not 
available to registered housing asociations where the Housing Corporation 
has given a first mortgage. Banks can also provide mortgages and loans for 
improvement.
Finance is also available from charitable trusts, pension funds and 
insurance companies. Details of this can be found in Mortgage Finance for 
Housing Co-operatives: a practical guide by Martin Jelfs (1984), published 
by the Empty Property Unit in London.
Financing Glasgow's Co-operatives
The COP will receive finance from each of these three main sources:
(1) Central Government will provide funding indirectly through Mortgage 
Interest Relief at Source (MIRAS) and Housing Benefit. Co-op members 
are unique in receiving both these benefits, as normally only owner- 
occupiers receive mortgage interest relief and tenants (public or 
private sector), Housing Benefit.
(2) Local Government, that is, GDC will supply repair and improvement 
grants from the non-HRA block. The amount of grant funding has yet to 
be decided, as the DC are in the process of applying for Housing 
Action Area (HAA) status for each of the co-ops. This would have 
three results:
(a) It raises the maximum grant to £13,800 per unit, compared to the 
£10,200 which would otherwise be the case.
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(b) Grants will be available at 90% level, rather than 50%, which 
will reduce the co-ops borrowing requirement.
(c) There is a possibility that the grant threshold limit of £13,800 
could be increased.
(3) The Private Sector Finance will come in the form of a loan to purchase 
the properties and to pay the ’top-up1 necessary on the repair and 
improvement grants.
SUBSIDY
The co-ops will receive no direct subsidy, unlike tenant management 
co-operatives which are paid allowances for management and maintenance, or 
HAG and RDG which is paid to registered Housing Associations through the 
Housing Corporation.
However, there will be indirect subidy, from both central and local 
government. This indirect subsidy will take the following forms:
1. Non-repayment of repair, improvement and environmental improvement 
grants.
2. Modified valuations
3. Tax relief on the mortgage reflected through a reduction in the rent 
paid to the co-op.
4. Housing Benefit, where applicable, will continue to apply.
5. Staff will be seconded from the DC during the development period at no 
cost. Once the properties are improved and re-let, the co-op will be 
expected to pay for its own staff.
6. Management agency services will be available from the DC at no cost 
during the development period and at 5% thereafter.
7. Some houses may have to be vacated to allow internal work to take
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place. Temporary accommodation will be available from the DC at no 
cost during the development period.
8. Loan guarantees will be provided by the DC under the provisions of 
Section 152 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 1966 as amended by Section 
31 of the Tenants Rights Etc. (Scotland) Act, 1980.
9. The DC will provide under the provisions of Section 44 of the Housing 
(Scotland) Act, 1974 an agency agreement to carry out the improvement 
and repair contract, saving the co-op bridging costs and VAT on the 
contract.
10. A major building society is prepared to provide capital advances
seeking no repayment of principal and the recovery of interest only, 
during the initial development period. Capital and interest 
repayments to commence thereafter on a minimum term of 25 years.
REPAYMENTS
Since the co-op borrows the capital, it is collectively responsible 
for the repayment of capital and interest over a fixed term. The member- 
tenants pay a rent to the co-op which includes repayment for the following 
charges and services:
1. The cost of servicing the capital and interest repayment on the co­
op^ mortgage. The rent paid by each member will have been modified 
to take account of the tax relief obtained through Mortgage Interest 
Relief at Source (MIRAS) on the co-op!s mortgage.
2. Management.
3. Repairs and Maintenance.
4. Contingency Costs.
5. Insurance
6. Service Charges - these must be written into the lease to obtain
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Housing Benefit where applicable.
7. Management Agency Services to be provided by the DC on a fee 
chargeable basis.
Cost rents will be set by the co-op, which will have to be sufficiently 
high to cover all of the above costs. Rents will be subject to annual 
review.
FAIR RENTS
Tenants of all housing co-operatives can have a Fair Rent registered 
by the local rent officer unless it is a co-ownership scheme (Section 86, 
Rent Act 1977, amended by the Tenantfs Rights Etc. [Scotland] Act, 1980). 
Fair rents are set without regard for either the tenants1 means or the 
landlords obligations. If Fair Rents which are lower than cost rents were 
enforced, it is possible that the mortgage payments would not be covered by 
the rental income, let alone all the other overheads.
At present, the Glasgow co-operatives will not have to register a Fair 
Rent as they will not receive either HAG or RDG from the Housing 
Corporation. The cash flow projections for each co-operative suggest that 
* rents will be approximately 30% higher than the average council house rent 
in Glasgow. This is because council rents have been kept artifically low, 
partly due to the level of central government subsidy the council receives 
and partly for political reasons. However, it is possible that if costs 
should rise, say due to a change in interest rates, this differential could 
increase and tenants could then apply for a Fair Rent to be registered. 
While it is unlikely that tenants would wish to put the co-op at risk by 
agreeing to uneconomic rents, this is at present a possibility. The 
Council are currently taking steps to close this legal loophole.
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TAX RELIEF
There are two ways that tax relief on interest payments can be made:
1. By way of a standard mortgage with interest relief at source (MIRAS).
2. By each tenant individually claiming tax relief on the part of their 
rent which has gone to pay the mortgage interest.
Prior to using either method, the co-operative will require the 
consent of the Secretary of State.
Procedure:
A co-op may receive tax relief on loan interest by either of the above 
methods if it receives approval from the SDD under Section 341 of the 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970. However, before it can receive such 
approval, all the following conditions must be met.
1. The co-operative must be registered under the Industrial and Provident 
Societies Act 1967.
2. Its tenancy agreement must exclude sub-letting, or at least not more 
than one month otherwise it may breach Section 341, 10(a) and (b) of 
the above Act.
3. Its model rules make it a fully mutual co-operative.
If these conditions can be met, the following information and
documentation should be sent to the SDD:
(a) A copy of the co-opfs certificate of registration with the Registrar 
of Friendly Societies.
(b) A copy of their model rules.
(c) A copy of their tenancy agreement.
(d) The number and type of dwellings in the co-operative and whether they 
are new build or conversion.
(e) The date on which they were, or will be occupied.
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The SDD will then send the co-op two copies each of two standard 
letters approving the co-op under Section 341 so that tax relief can be 
obtained by either method.
THE REGISTRATION PROCESS
Each co-operative must make the following formal applications:
1. Affiliation with the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, for 
use of their model rules - fee £40.
2. Selection of a suitable name for the co-op. Once agreed with the
tenants, the name together with the names of 7 members will be 
submitted in advance of the formal constitution for clearance by the 
Registrar of Friendly Societies. This accelerates the process and may 
reduce the registration period.
3. The proposals to form the co-op, the feasibility study and the model
rules for the co-op should be sent to the Secretary of State expressly
stating the intention to seek tax relief on the mortgage.
4. On approval of this application, the co-op should make application to 
the Housing Corporation for registration purposes only. Neither HAG 
nor RDG are likely to be available.
Simultaneously, the co-op should make formal application to the Inland 
Revenue to ensure that tax relief on their mortgage applies.
Registration with the Registrar of Friendly Societies and the Housing 
Corporation is essential. The co-op then becomes a legal entity with which 
the DC can legitimately negotiate and to whom the ownership of the stock 
can be transferred.
Registration with the Housing Corporation is subject to the
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Corporations approval of the terms of the Minute of Agreement between the 
District Council and the co-operative. Registration provides the following 
advantages:
1. The co-op are not liable for corporation tax on any surpluses.
2. The Housing Corporation will provide financial monitoring and audit 
services, which will attract private investment.
3. A lender may insist on registration for a co-op which is fully mutual 
in order to avoid the security of tenure provision in the 1980 Act.
MANAGEMENT
The co-op will, at the end of a two year development period, become 
fully autonomous. This will be reflected by the management structure and 
organisation, which will closely resemble a community based housing 
association. All the members will elect a Management Committee which will 
appoint staff, such as a housing manager, a development officer and 
clerical administrative support. These staff costs have been allowed for 
in the feasibility studies.
MANAGEMENT AGENCY SERVICES
The tenant organisations have requested that the DC provide a 
management agency service on a rechargeable fee basis of 5/&. It is 
intended that this service should be withdrawn after the 2 year development 
period should the co-op seek to become fully autonomous.
The services provided under the agency agreement are likely to include 
the following.
(i) Allocation, Policies and Practice
There is much concern that allocation policies are fair and
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equitable. Some have feared that more difficult1 groups, such as 
ex-offenders, ex-mental patients, etc. might be discriminated 
against. Other groups, such as single parents and the unemployed, 
are already well represented in the co-op areas, and it seems 
unlikely that they would discriminate against others in the same 
circumstances.
At present, policy guidelines for the co-ops are under review. It 
is proposed that similar guidelines to those used by the Housing 
Associations should be adopted, i.e. the DC should retain some 
proportion of nomination rights. However, if the co-op is to become 
fully autonomous it is difficult to argue that any external body 
should have a major influence over allocation policies - either the 
tenants are responsible enough to run their own co-op or they are 
not.
(ii) Estate Management, Anti-Social Policy, Etc.
Procedures related to these policies will be operated by the co-op 
and their management staff. Guidelines on current DC policy have 
been issued in advance to assist the co-op to establish its own.
(iii) Financial Control and Monitoring
Once formed, the co-op will have to satisfy its creditors that it is 
being managed efficiently. As a fully mutual co-op there will be a 
requirement to make quarterly financial returns with an annual 
audit. With the involvement of the Housing Corporation, providing 
full financial monitoring and and audit services, the co-op will be 
required to appoint their own accountants to prepare financial 
statements and returns. Allowances have been made in preparing the 
rents to cover professional fees.
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(iv) Repairs and Maintenance, Policy and Practice
Procedural guidelines on practice and operational management of this 
service have been issued to the pilot co-operatives. However, it 
does seem unlikely that the co-op will wish to follow these 
guidelines - one of the major complaints of most council tenants is 
dissatisfaction with the councils repair service. This will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
(v) Rent Collection, Rent Arrears, Housing Benefit and Rate 
Collection
These are crucial services for the co-opTs success. In the short­
term, they will be covered by the agency agreement with the DC. 
This will give each co-op time to decide whether it wishes to 
employ its own staff to carry out these services or purchase some, 
or all of them from an outside body, such as a secondary co­
operative or the District Council.
TRAINING AND EDUCATION
Training and education needs will have to be identified within each 
co-op. At present, many members of the Steering Committees have been 
involved in the setting up of the co-op for over a year and have gained a 
great deal of experience. However, there is clearly a need to establish 
some sort of training programme for those who are to be involved in running 
the co-ops.
Initial discussions have been held between the Scottish Federation of 
Housing Associations (SFHA), their Secretary and Training Officer for 
Scotland, to establish joint and shared experience training programmes 
between members of existing housing associations and the new co-
94
ops. There are also plans to set up a secondary co-op to service the 
Glasgow co-ops, one function of which would be training and education.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP PROGRAMME:
THE PILOT STUDY AREAS
PREFACE
So far we have examined the model for Community Ownership and the 
legal and financial procedures involved in setting up a par-value co­
operative. We now turn to the three pilot study areas to see how this 
model will work in practice. In each of these case studies, a preliminary 
sketch is given of the background of the area, followed by a narrative 
account of the development of the par-value co-op. Much of the information 
in this chapter came from the feasibility studies produced by the 
consultant architects, McGurn, Logan & Duncan, and Thornley & Thornley.
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The three areas are quite different in some respects although similar 
in others. In Calvay Crescent, Barlanark, the houses are basically sound 
and most of the proposed improvements are external to the dwellings, to 
improve the 'image1 of the area. In contrast, the houses in Ballantay / 
Road, Castlemilk have deteriorated to such an extent that the area is now 
over 80% vacant. Over £20,000 will need to be spent on each dwelling to 
bring up to the standard requested by the co-op. The co-op at Broomhouse 
is unique among the pilot study areas in that it is not difficult to let. 
However, the dwellings do require to be extensively modernised to provide a 
satisfactory standard of basic amenities. Figure 3 shows the location of 
the three pilot co-ops.
CALVAY CRESCENT, BARLANARK
The brief summary of the development of the COP given earlier does not 
do justice to the tremendous amount of hard work done by many people, 
particularly the tenants groups involved. The commitment and drive shown 
by the steering committees in particular has been commented on by all those 
involved in community ownership.
One particularly committed group of tenants were those at Calvay 
Crescent in Barlanark, who were involved right from the beginning in early 
1983. The fact that the early proposals for par-value co-operatives now 
appear to be getting off the ground is largely due to their efforts.
Background
Barlanark is an early post-war estate of 2,318 houses, lying to the 
south of Easterhouse,one of Glasgow's four peripheral estates which is the 
size of a small town with 13,881 council houses and only a few hundred
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private houses. Barlanark is separated from other houses by a major road 
and a railway line. It has all the problems usually associated with DTL 
areas, which have resulted in a high turnover and vacancy rate and a low 
level of demand for the area, exemplified by the low number of points 
needed for a house in Barlanark. GDC have classified the whole estate as 
Stress Category 1. Figure 4 shows a street plan of the area.
Some of the outstanding problems of the area are as follows:
Social Problems
high unemployment: approximately 75% of heads of household are 
unemployed;
few leisure facilities: e.g. only one public house for 10,000 people, 
compared to one per 500 for the rest of Glasgow;
few community facilities: the nearest shopping centre and doctors 
surgery are at Easterhouse or Bridgeton, an expensive bus journey 
away;
poor public transport provision.
Physical Problems
mass housing of large homogenous units with no feeling of 
neighbourhood;
inadequate variety of house types, i.e. mainly large family housing 
with no provision for special needs;
large communal open space, which is poorly maintained and contributes 
greatly to the !run down1 appearance of the area; (see Figure 5, 
Calvay Cresent)
no off-street car parking facilities.
In response to these problems, a group of tenants from the area 
approached their District Housing Manager in early 1983 to discover what
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improvements were planned. After a series of discussions, a par-value co­
op was proposed as one way of tackling the problems of the area.
The tenants group, supported by the DC, selected their own consultants 
and in January 1984, Messrs. McGurn, Logan and Duncan were commissioned to 
prepare a Feasibility Study on behalf of the tenants (the consultants* fees 
were paid by the District Council). The main objectives of this 
feasibility study were as follows:
(i) A full use and condition survey.
(ii) A technical appraisal of known problems.
(iii) Environmental and improvement proposals, including all necessary 
work.
(iv) Full costings for all necessary work.
(v) Regular meetings with tenants to provide full visual and written 
reports.
In the Feasibility Study, the following proposals are outlined to 
tackle the physical and social problems.
Physical Remedies
(1) To Create Managed and Defensible Ground Cover
To achieve this objective, the existing ground floor main door flats 
will be given full territorial and maintenance rights over the front 
and back gardens, with upstairs tenants having private balconies and 
access to a communal garden in the rear (see Figure 8). Back areas 
will be redesigned with robust fencing, bin storage, paths and a 
mixture of soft and hard landscaping. Lines of trees to front 
gardens, new fencing and gates will soften the harsh facade of the 
buildings.
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These will consist of general upgrading of out-of-date amenities, i.e. 
rewiring, replumbing, and cosmetic improvement aimed at changing the 
current institutional* image of the buildings. Figures 6, 7 and 8 
show the area as it is just now and the architects impression of what 
the area will look like after improvement.
Social Remedies
(1) Tenant Participation
Street, block and close committees have been set up with a view to 
establishing maximum tenant participation. It is hoped that a 
Development Officer (who will be seconded from the DC) will soon be 
appointed by the Steering Committee. During the two year development 
period, the DC will pay the Development Officers salary. After this, 
the co-operative will be expected to employ their own staff.
(2) Provision of Amenities
Play areas are to be provided, with careful evaluation of the age 
groups and territorial lines of the area in terms of various 
neighbourhoods, to avoid imbalance and abuse.
A vacant building is to be converted into a resource centre.
It has been suggested that vacant land be released form normal 
planning procedures to provide opportunities for small builders, car 
repair yards, etc.
New shopping facilities on the main Edinburgh Road have been 
suggested. There are a few shops in the area, but they are shuttered 
and neglected, although still trading profitably. The co-op intend to 
take these shops over and refurbish them with a view to negotiating, 
either with the existing traders or new traders, new leases and shop 
front designs to provide a better quality of shopping, possibly
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(3) Job Creation
It has been suggested that the building improvements will create 
employment and training opportunities. There will also be the routine 
building and garden maintenance required by the co-op.
FINANCE
The repairs and improvements of the ground floor houses will be funded 
up to a total of 90% of £14,800 if the area is granted HAA status. This 
represents a total of 90 houses, 25% of the stock. The balance of 276 
houses will be grant-aided to a total of 90% of £13,800 per house. This 
gives a total grant requirement of £4,626,720, which will be supplemented 
by private sector finance of £514,080, giving a total of over £5m.
The acquisition cost of the houses will be £952 each. The cash flow 
projections show substantial surpluses in the region of £50,000 per annum 
so with good management, the co-op should be viable.
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FIGURE 9
This is the prevailing house type in Calvay - four storey 
tenements with existing main door entry. The ground floor 
flats are to be allocated a front and back garden and they 
will be allocated to tenants who express a desire to 
care for a garden. These flats will be provided with 
decorative window louvres which will also function as 
security screens.
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A cosmetic programme of 
improvement should 
change the harsh, 
institutional facade 
of these buddings. New 
balconies, windows and 
doors are to be provided, 
as well as a general 
'facelift1.
Vandalism is a constant 
problem. These children 
are playing with the 
plastic screens used to 
protect the windows 
of vacant houses. New 
play areas are to be 
built for small toddlers, 
children, and older 
teenagers' activity 
areas. These may be 
funded by Urban Aid.
FIGURE 11
These common garden areas are to be fenced, 
giving clothes drying and refuse disposal 
facilities. There will also be common foot­
paths.
The existing shops are shuttered and neglected, although 
still trading. The co-op intend to take these over 
and refurbish them, to provide a better quality of 
shopping and new front designs.
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Ballantay Road is situated in the centre of Castlemilk, a large 
council estate of 9*873 houses lying on the south eastern boundary of 
Glasgow. The estate as a whole was built from the 1940s onwards on the old 
Castlemilk Estate. Ballantay Road is very close to the site of the 
original mansion house, Castlemilk House, adjacent to an area of mature 
trees and a burn. The setting would be envied by many if the housing 
could be brought up to an acceptable standard ( Figure 12).
The properties are fairly similar to those in Barlanark and the area 
exhibits many of the same problems, particularly the shortage of a good 
shopping centre and other amenities and expensive transport to the City 
centre. However, the situation is much worse than that in Calvay Crescent, 
in that the area has deteriorated to such an extent that over 80% of the 
houses are vacant. This has left a small group of tenants who are 
dedicated to improving their area.
BACKGROUND
In the early 1970s Ballantay Road was a pleasant, desirable area 
according to the local residents. However, by 1979 the area had 
deteriorated and there were a number of vacant houses which were becoming 
DTL. It is difficult to discover why this change occurred. Some of the 
residents have attributed it to a change in the District Council policies - 
several homeless and single parent families were housed in this area, which 
is mainly 3, 4 and 5 apartment houses, and the child density rose to over 
250 children in an area of 90 houses. Consequently there were problems 
with vandalism and many of the dwellings fell into disrepair.
Some of the residents from the Ballantay area were at this time part 
of the Tormusk/Scarrel Area Tenants Association, which covered 1,213
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houses. However, they did not feel that the problems of Ballantay were 
being adequately dealt with so they formed their own Association in 1931.
The immediate objectives of this new Tenants Association were to 
ensure that repairs were carried out and to campaign for the eventual 
modernisation of the properties. The committee met weekly and held regular 
meetings with representatives from the Area Office and with the local 
councillor, organised street parties and clean-ups and generally worked to 
improve the area.
However, concurrent with the formation of the Ballantay Tenants 
Association, the DC sent out a circular to tenants listing the various 
possibilies for the area. These were demolition, sale to a private 
developer, or renovation and changed layouts to reduce child density. 
Alternatively the establishment of a Tenant Management Housing Co-operative 
was suggested.
By mid 1983 discussions on forming a tenant management co-op were in 
progress with the DC. A policy of rehousing people from the area was 
underway and while the possibility of a tenant management co-op was new to 
the residents, it seemed to offer them the opportunity to improve their 
homes and the surrounding environment. The Committee visited Speirs tenant 
management Co-op and were impressed by what had been achieved there. Hopes 
were raised and the residents felt that the houses would soon be improved. 
Indeed three families moved into the area on the understanding that a co-op 
was to be formed.
However, the Committee was then informed by GDC that there was no 
money to carry out improvements in the financial year 1984-85. Many of the 
tenants saw this as the end of the road for their area - all the tenemental 
properties and most of the terraced houses were by now empty.
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COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP
In early 1984 a DC official suggested that a par-value co-op might 
speed up the improvement programme. After a series of meetings with the 
DC, the Tenant Participation Advisory Service (TPAS), housing associations 
and others the committee decided to proceed with a Feasibility Study on the 
formation of a par-value housing co-operative.
Consultant architects Thornley & Thornley were appointed in April 1984 
and carried out their Feasibility Study over the summer and early autumn. 
This examined the following subjects:
(i) technical and building requirements;
(ii) financial viability of the proposed co-op;
(iii) the development process.
THE TENANTS
The present residents of the Ballantay area are committed to the idea 
of co-operative housing and have put a great deal of work over the last 
year into learning about par-value co-ops. They are very involved in the 
community - for example, on the Committee are two youth leaders, three 
community councillors, a playgroup and summer playscheme leader and one 
person who is Secretary to the Steering Committee, the Tormusk/Scarrel 
Tenants Association and the Community Council! (Figure 13 shows a Tenants1 
Association meeting).
The residents feel that it is important that the COP works in their 
area, not just for their own sake, but to be an example to other areas* to 
prove that something can be done. Many residents of such areas have given 
up hope and the co-op is seen as a way of cutting through the apathy and 
involving people.
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As stated previously, the DC policy of rehousing from this area has
r 11left the majority of the units vacant. In this way, Ballantay Co-opL IJ 
will be more like a new build co-op, in that in the selection of future 
tenants it may be possible to ensure that they are willing to participate 
in the co-op and appreciate that they are joining an organisation, not just 
accepting a house.
The DC are exploring the idea of making up a separate waiting list of 
those who are interested in being involved in a co-op. Having obtained 
this waiting list, the allocations policy would have to be used to decide 
how the waiting list should be ordered. Further details of the problems 
associated with allocations are discussed in the next chapter.
THE DESIGN APPROACH
There appears to have been a great deal of consultation and discussion 
between the architects and the tenants about different plan solutions. 
This enabled not only the residents to come to terms with plans and details 
but enabled the architect to establish from the residents* own experience 
what the precise requirements of the prospective members might be.
At an early stage it was decided by the residents that no major 
structural alterations would take place. The location of the kitchen and 
bathroom would remain the same. Alternative design solutions for the 
detail of spaces and equipment were presented and the level of 
specification was discussed, particularly in relation to the type of 
heating and hot water system to be adopted.
1. The registered name is Castlemilk East Housing Co-operative Ltd.
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The residents were keen to provide some outward indication of their 
status as a co-op, and the type and style of fenestration was discussed. 
To this end, the addition of porches to the front and rear was investigated 
together with the merits or otherwise of external decoration. However, 
there was much less emphasis on external repairs and improvement than that 
envisaged by Calvay co-op. In this case, the emphasis is on internal work. 
The reasons for this are self-evident from the next section.
BUILDING CONDITIONS 
Internal Amenities and Repairs
The properties can be divided into two categories - the vacant and the 
occupied. There are 11 occupied terrace houses out of a total of 32 
terrace houses and 58 tenement flats.
All vacant properties are boarded up. They have no sanitary or 
culinary fittings in place, all service pipes and doors have been removed 
to reduce further vandalism, the wiring in most cases needs replacement, 
water mains are generally in lead, roofs are uninsulated as are the cavity 
walls and rot outbreaks are evident, particularly in the vicinity of 
bathroom and kitchen waste pipes. There are areas of water damage, the 
single glazed timber windows are generally ill-fitting and the glass in the 
majority of vacant properties has been smashed. Internal plumbing is non­
existent to all intents and purposes.
All vacant proprties are affected to some degree or other by 
vandalism, smoke, fire or water damage, or a combination of all three, from 
a minor extent to complete devastation.
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Much of the property is vandalised with no roof flashings or tiles. 
Three houses have no roof at all due to fire damage. All downpipes and 
gutters are defective. However, the external roughcast, though dirty, is 
sound.
PROPOSALS
The internal improvement works in general involve complete rewiring; 
complete renewal of plumbing and new mains; provision of new bathroom 
suites and kitchen fitments; provision of full central heating by back 
boiler and radiators.
The internal repair works involve the replacement of all windows and 
doors, skirtings and facings; replacement of all ceilings and repairs to 
defective areas of plasterwork; eradication of dry and wet rot.
The external improvement works include the complete recovering of roof 
finishes; repairs to chimneys; provision of loft insulation and cavity wall 
insulation; redecoration of roughcast; addition of new porches to terrace 
houses; repairs to balconies and new close doors and entry systems.
FINANCE
Obviously such extensive repair work will cost a great deal. The 
total costs for the 90 houses are over £2m for house improvement and 
repairs and nearly £150,000 for environmental work.
It is clear that given the high cost of capital works, the borrowing 
requirement on the balance after existing grants of £10,200 per unit were 
applied would be unrealistically high for the proposed co-op to be viable. 
Therefore additional grant aid is to be made available.
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Originally the City Estates Department had valued the houses at £2,000 
each, but further discussions with the DC have led to the purchase price 
being revalued at £444 per house, plus legal and other expenses. Repair 
and improvement works at £21,505 per house are to qualify for 90% grant aid 
and environmental improvements, at £1,642 per house, are to qualify for 
100% grant aid.
Although this is a very high level of grant aid, it is important to 
bear in mind the high cost of leaving these houses vacant. Since 1979, the 
total loss of rental income has been in excess of £100,000. The loss of 
rental income on the 77 houses now vacant is running at £2,845 per month, 
with security services costing £3,700 per month. This excludes the cost of 
!Meshlite! screens and other remedial or security work.
Demolition of the properties will leave an outstanding loan debt and 
past investment in public utilities underutilised. It would also lead to 
the loss of 32 five apartment houses, of which there is a shortage in 
Castlemilk. It is unlikely that public finance could be obtained for the 
construction of new housing following full or partial demolition.
Therefore it seems that a par-value co-operative is the only solution 
for this area, as the vast sums of money needed for rehabilitation are 
unlikely to be available from the Housing Revenue Account in the near 
future. The small group of tenants remaining are committed to the area and 
to extending the present tenant management co-operative to a par-value co­
operative by taking over ownership of the houses.
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FIGURE 14
At Ballantay, all of the tenemental properties 
(above) and most of the terraced houses (below) 
are now empty. All vacant properties are boarded 
up but most have been extensively vandalised. 
Three houses have no roof at all, due to fire 
damage.
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FIGURE 15
Vandalism is a severe problem in Ballantay, despite 
the security guards who patrol the area day and 
night. It is difficult to know whether this will 
stop once the houses are improved.
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FIGURE 16
Despite the run down appearance of the area as a 
whole, the occupied houses and the gardens are well 
cared for. Some of the houses have been flooded 
from burst pipes in the vacant properties next 
door and windows are constantly being broken.
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Broomhouse is different from the other two pilot studies in that it is 
not an area of DTL housing. Most of the houses are occupied and many of 
the social problems typical of such areas are not found in Broomhouse. 
However, it is similar in three important respects: first, its isolation
from other housing and its lack of amenities; second, the need for 
modernisation of the housing stock, and third, its history of active tenant 
involvement.
BACKGROUND
Broomhouse is situated right on Glasgow's eastern boundary and the 
group of 101 houses is physically separated from the rest of the city. The 
group of houses, known locally as The Village, is surrounded by fields and 
roads, with Calderpark Zoo being its immediate neighbour. Apart from a few 
properties on London Road, the nearest concentrations of housing are at 
Baillieston and Uddingston and there are no shops within easy walking 
distance (see Figure 17).
Most of the houses were built by Lanarkshire County Council in the 
1920s and 1930s, with 14 houses being added in the 1950s. The area, while 
isolated, was sought after, and the houses and gardens were well 
maintained.
However, over the years it became apparent that while the houses were 
attractive and substantial, they were in need of repair and modernisation. 
Lanarkshire County Council had proposed to modernise the houses in 1973 but 
this was not carried out and when local government was reorganised in 1975 
they were transferred to GDC in an unmodernised state.
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Community Council in 1975. In early 1979 the DC approached the Community 
Council with proposals for setting up a tenant management co-operative. A 
Steering Committee was formed which held meetings throughout 1979, 1980 and 
1981. While these discussions were continuing in early 1982, the residents 
took responsibility for forwarding repairs to GDC which led to improved 
efficiency but also made the tenants more impatient for the setting up of a 
fully fledged tenant management co-op. At the same time the name 'co-op1 
was being rapidly adopted by both residents and officials without formal 
ratification of its status.
The need for modernisation of the houses was still apparent to the 
residents and thus in September 1982, representatives from the Steering 
Committee met with officials of the DC to press for this work to take 
place. This led to plans for the proposed co-op to manage an improvement 
and repair programme and to this end a full time administrator was 
appointed in May 1983. As a result, the residents began to assume more 
direct control over repairs and contacted various contractors to tender for 
a yearly maintenance contract.
Thus, in spite of the fact that a tenant management co-op had not been 
formally set up, the residents had taken control of repairs and had a full 
time member of staff. They had also commissioned an architect to carry out 
a Repair and Improvement Programme, but were informed by the DC in December 
1983 that the funding would not be available in the next financial year. 
Naturally the residents were deeply disappointed and felt that they were 
being overlooked by the authorities.
In February 1984 a meeting was held with various officials from the 
Housing Department at which the concept of a par-value co-op was outlined.
From then on, the history of the COP in Broomhouse is very similar to
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than in the other two areas. Over the last five years the Committee has 
built up a considerable body of experience both in organising repairs and 
in looking at various options for the improvement and subsequent management 
of their houses. Thus the residents of the area are well placed to take on 
the responsibilities of establishing a par-value co-operative.
DESIGN APPROACH
The design approach in Broomhouse has been very similar to that in 
Ballantay, as the same firm of architects were involved in both projects. 
A series of meetings were held with residents of the nine different house 
types involved to disuss the detailed plans for possible improvements and 
necessary repairs. In all but one instance, layouts were altered to 
accommodate tenants suggestions.
It was generally agreed that those houses which lent themselves to 
extensive improvement (i.e. considerable kitchen enlargement) should be 
designed to take advantage of this.
The area contains 102 houses, one of which has been sold to the 
sitting tenant under the Right to Buy legislation and thus is excluded from 
the co-op. Of the remaining 101 houses all are occupied except for seven - 
the co-op office, three houses temporarily vacated for rot work, one house 
used for decants and two casual vacancies.
INTERNAL AMENITIES AND REPAIRS
No settlement or major structural defects have been noted. There have 
been some complaints of dampness below windows, which are likely to be due 
to a combination of condensation and badly fitting windows. On the whole, 
the houses are well lit and ventilated. The existing water supply is
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while the plasterwork in kitchens is poor and quite unsuitable for mounting 
wall units on.
Most windows are ill-fitting, single glazed and with existing 
astragals. The majority of the houses require rewiring and replumbing.
EXTERNAL REPAIRS
The roofs have reached the end of their useful life and unless renewed 
will be a constant maintenance problem. External doors are often ill- 
fitting and rotten and render cracking has occured in certain house types.
PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS TO HOUSES
No major structural alterations are to be carried out and only non­
supporting brick walls and stud partitions are to be demolished. Proposed 
improvements include new sanitary fittings in bathrooms, new kitchen units 
and worktops and new doors with a half-hour fire resistance rating. 
Central heating will be provided in every house with residents given the 
choice of gas, electricity or solid fuel.
Repairs will be carried out as necessary to brick and woodwork and all 
windows will be renewed to the DC!s specification. Externally, roofs and 
gutters will be replaced and existing renderwork repaired.
PROPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS
These include the repair of external steps and handrails. Tarmac 
paths are to be resurfaced and existing timber fences are to be replaced in 
metal.
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The houses are to be acquired at a cost of £4,700 each, plus legal and 
other expenses. Repair and improvement works at £14,013 per house will 
qualify for 90% grant aid and environmental improvements at £1,648 per 
house will qualify for 100% grant aid.
It has been recommended that the houses are sold at £3,100 per unit to 
promote the viability of the co-op. This will provide a capital receipt to 
the DC in the order of £300,000. The problem for the co-op and the DC is 
that one house in the area has been sold to the tenant at a price 
considerably higher than both of these values. If the houses are to be 
sold at a price less than that set by the City Estates Department, the 
permission of the Secretary of State is required. Unless a lower price is 
set, the revised cash flow statement has indicated that the co-op will be 
barely viable, and the District Council will not agree to progress the co­
op. At present, the DC is awaiting consent for the lower valuation from 
the Secretary of State.
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FIGURE 19
Renovation at Broomhouse is complicated by the 9 
different house types. The flated blocks on 
Lusshill Terrace (above) contain 4 houses each and are 
approximately one third of the housing stock of the 
area. Below are three apartment flats on 
Calderpark Avenue.
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Above is one of the four apartment semi-detached 
houses. Only 3 blocks were built to this design 
and one is in private ownership. At the end of 
Calderpark Crescent are 2 short terraces of 7 
houses. Built 30 years after work at Broomhouse 
began, they are poorly planned and have more than 
their fair share of problems. Five closes permit 
direct passage to gardens but give no access to 
houses.
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Windows are sash and case 
in most house types, 
single glazed and most 
with existing astragals. 
On the whole they are 
ill-fitting and in a 
state of deterioration. 
Render cracking has 
occurred in certain house 
types.
All windows will be 
renewed to the District 
Council's specification.
The immediate environment of Broomhouse is very 
attractive with the exception of the bottom of 
Calderpark Crescent where the road carries on 
to rough ground and the remains of the brickworks. 
Residents are anxious to see a screen wall or 
barrier erected at the foot of the Crescent, in 
order to hide the area behind.
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These case studies have two important features in common: first, they 
are all (except Broomhouse) in DTL areas and second, they all have a 
history of tenant involvement in the community.
1. DTL
Although Broomhouse is not, strictly speaking, DTL, it still has many 
of the problems associated with such areas, such as the lack of amenities 
and the poor state of repair of the houses. It is also phsyically isolated 
from other housing by fields, woodlands and Calderpark (Glasgow) Zoo. Most 
of the other tenant groups on the waiting list are in areas of housing 
stress, particularly Priesthill Traditional Action Group (Pollok), the 
Southdeen Action Group (Drumchapel) and the Possil Steering Committee, who 
are high up on the waiting list.
Why has the COP been set up in such areas? There appear to be three 
main reasons. First, the seemingly intractable problems of these areas, 
which were outlined in detail in Chapter 2. Many tenants in such areas 
have given up hope of ever seeing their area improved - for example, the 
residents of Calvay Crescent would have to wait until 1991 to be renovated 
under the Improvement Programme. Likewise, many officials dealing with 
housing stress areas are hampered by lack of finance to implement projects. 
For these areas, the COP seems to be their last chance - as one tenant put 
it ’’things can’t get any worse”!
A second, important factor is that of political acceptability. It is 
unlikely that the Secretary of State would consent to houses being sold to 
a housing co-op if there was any indication that the individual tenants 
wished to exercise their right to buy. Linked to this is the problem of 
the selling price of the houses, which has arisen at Broomhouse. Too high 
a valuation will make the co-op unviable, but prices are unlikely to be
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suitably low unless the area is DTL.
A third factor influencing the choice of areas has been the District 
Council's commitment to redeploying the available resources in areas of 
multiple deprivation. In the past few years, the greater allocation has 
been to the non-HRA block which could not be used to improved public sector 
housing. The COP provides a mechanism for re-routing this non-HRA finance 
to areas of high stress. This will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter.
2. Conmunity Involvement
Many of those involved in the COP have been impressed by the 
dedication shown by the tenants. Many are unemployed at present and have 
worked full time learning more about the prospective co-op, visiting tenant 
management co-ops and holding meetings with various people such as 
officials from housing, social work, community education, other tenants 
groups, residents of the local area and so on. Without this hard work, it 
is unlikely that community ownership would ever have got off the ground.
One point that comes over clearly from all three case studies is that 
the impetus for change came from the tenants themselves. They were 
dissatisfied with the condition of their houses and put pressure on the 
Council to do something about it. While it is true tht the idea of par- 
value co-ops did not originally come from the tenants, they have been the 
people who seized on the idea and explored it. The complaint that the idea 
did not originate from the residents but was imposed on them by the Council 
does not seem to be valid.tU The tenants could hardly think of the idea 
when they had never heard of par-value co-ops.
1. See for example John Edgington, "The Tenants Who Want to go Into 
Property”, The Guardian, 26th September 1984.
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The level of tenant participation in design seems to vary between each 
co-op, probably due to the different attitude of the consultant architects 
involved and the size of the tenant groups. It is easier to consult with a 
dozen residents at Ballantay or even 100 households at Broomhouse, rather 
than over 350 at Calvay Crescent. Also at Broomhouse, the architects held 
meetings with the tenants of each different house type, and the maximum
number in the groups was 20 houses. It is interesting to note that at
Broomhouse and Calvay, the tenants are deciding on the plans for their own 
houses. At Broomhouse, especially, there seems to be a great deal of 
choice which can be exercised by the individual tenant over, for example 
what form of heating he or she wishes.
On the other hand, the residents at Ballantay are having to make such 
decisions for the future residents, as most of the houses are vacant. 
However, the Steering Committee are very aware of this responsibility. 
"You’re not just in it for yourself" as one member said, "you are speaking
for others who are still to come".
A final point is that since interest in a par-value co-op arose from 
tenant dissatisfaction with their housing, would tenants want to be 
involved in running their area if someone else could do it properly? Are 
they only getting involved, because in their eyes, the Council has failed? 
Is it right that tenants should have to ’do-it-themselves* to have it done 
properly?
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EVALUATING THE COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP PROGRAMME
PREFACE
In the last chapter we examined the three pilot co-operatives and drew 
some conclusions about two of their important features, namely, that they 
are all in areas of stress and all have very active tenants1 associations. 
In this chapter we turn to the difficult question of evaluation, focussing 
particularly on the potential areas of conflict between the different 
groups involved.
The innovative nature of the COP has already been outlined. It is the 
first project of its type in Scotland!! 1] and there has been a great deal of 
interest shown by other housing authorities and tenants1 groups. It 
therefore seems likely that at some point in the future an attempt will be 
made to evaluate the scheme. This may be done formally, by Glasgow 
District Council or the SDD, or in an informal manner. Such an evaluation 
would be used to inform policy decisions about whether or not the project 
should continue to be funded and whether it should be repeated elsewhere.
Therefore it is important to consider how such a scheme should be 
evaluated. Evaluation judges success in relation to certain goals. We 
must ask whose goals are considered relevant? Whose voices are heard and 
whose neglected? What criteria are relevant, what is. Success1 in this 
context? Whose purposes should the evaluator serve?
Evaluation is clearly a political issue, especially in this context, 
as such a project involves the allocation of scarce resources. As Jenkins 
(1976) comments, there can be no value-free research - all research must 
proceed from initial valuations of some kind. Try as we will, there is no 
escape from "the context of evaluation". One way out of the dilemma, he 
suggests, is to take the political bull by the horns and build "multiple 
perspectives" into the evaluation, so that it presents, rther than resolves 
the implicit political issues.
In order to consider these "multiple perspectives" we must analyse the 
aims of the different actors involved in the situation. Two points should
1. There is one other par-value co-op in Edinburgh, the Lister Housing 
Co-op. This was set up in houses which were formerly privately 
rented, like most of the English co-ops.
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First, it is necessary to define these objectives at the start of the 
project, as these are the goals which influenced the original policy 
decisions, although they/ will change over time in response to newi
information. The definition of goals at the outset is essential as one of 
the chief problems of a summative evaluation is attempting to evaluate 
initiatives against a set of criteria which are often not closely related 
to the original objectives, and also trying to assess these objectives in 
hindsight.
The second point is that the objectives of different groups may 
conflict, and consequently ’success1 in the eyes of one group may not be so 
in the eyes of another. In this case, differing objectives may have to be 
ranked and the desires of one group given preference over those of another.
Thus it is useful to look in more detail at the objectives of some of 
the different groups involved in the COP and the priority they attache to 
these objectives. The next few pages outline their intent, an important 
stage in evaluation (Figure 22) - the expression of goals in relation to 
the problem and the formulation of specific aims.
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Unfortunately it is sometimes the case that tenants1 views are the last 
to be taken into account. We have often replaced consultation with 
information, telling the tenants what decisions have been reached and what 
plans have been made, rather than tackling the problems that they feel are 
important and in ways that are seen to be relevant (Figure 23).
Fortunately in this case, the tenants have been involved in 
discussions from the beginning. Indeed, as we saw earlier, the impetus for 
the COP came from the tenants in that the proposals are a response by the 
council to the tenants1 demands for action.
All the tenants interviewed seemed to have two main aims for a co-op 
in their area - first to improve the houses and the surrounding area, and 
second to create a sense of community. We will examine each of these in 
turn.
Physical improvement and repair of the dwelling is clearly an 
essential, especially in Broomhouse where they lack most modern facilities 
and in Ballantay, where all the vacant houses are at present uninhabitable. 
In Calvay Crescent, however, the problem is more one of the 'image* of the 
area, so much of the work to be carried out is external to the dwellings, 
such as landscaping and work on the fenestration of the buildings. Tenants 
were keen to point out that such improvements would create houses that 
residents will want to care for.
Several also expressed hope that vandalism would be reduced because 
parents will be penalised financially if their children persistently damage 
property.
The second aim, that of creating a sense of community in the area is 
more difficult to pin down. A number of different aspects are involved.
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neetmg nousing neea was mentioned Dy tne tenants group in oanantay. 
They were concerned that young married couples and elderly relatives were 
unable to get a house in the area, near to their friends and family. They 
also have plans to integrate old people into the community and are 
organising a type of informal home help system, whereby neighbours will run 
errands for older people and generally keep an eye on them. This type of 
mutual support is what many of the tenants see as a community. One member 
of the steering committee mentioned that living in such an area would be a 
good example to children, to teach them to care for others.
The co-ops at Ballantay and Calvay are particularly concerned to 
reduce vandalism, which has been a great problem. To this end they have 
plans to involve young people in the co-op and to run youth clubs and build 
play areas for children. However, the tenants are aware that these 
problems will not disappear overnight.
Another aspect of creating a sense of community concerns tenant 
involvement in running the co-op. Broomhouse is already dealing with some 
aspects of management and Ballantay is a tenant management co-operative, so 
the committees are well aware of the amount of work involved. This task of 
involving people is greater at Calvay, with over 350 houses, so the co-op 
has developed a system of close, block and street representatives. This 
question of community involvement will be discussed at length in the 
concluding chapter.
In conclusion, the general feeling among the tenants seems to be a 
desire to improve their area, to create decent homes at a price people can 
afford and to develop a community where people know each other and have a 
sense of pride in their place.
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The problem as seen by the officers and members of GDC was described 
in detail in Chapter 3. The physical problems of decay and obsolescence, 
dampness, high vacancy rates, etc. combined with the cutbacks in resources 
available to tackle these difficulties have forced the Council to think 
again about housing finance, management and maintenance policies, 
allocation policies, and so on.
Any new proposals also have to be politically acceptable to the 
Labour-controlled Council, which is strongly against any type of 
privatisation, whether it be council house sales or the sale of council 
land to private developers. For this reason, the Homesteading project, 
which appears to have been successful by many different measures, has not 
yet been repeated.
Initially there were some reservations among members who saw the COP 
as another form of privatisation. However, they were eventually persuaded 
that community ownership was Socialism in action1, an acceptable 
alternative to the private rented sector. This was largely due to the 
sheer momentum of enthusiasm that had built up among the various tenants* 
groups, encouraged by several committed officers and members, including 
Iain Nicolson (Chief Housing Officer, Community Ownership), Ronnie McDonald 
(Assistant Director, Private Sector) and Baillie James McLean, the Housing 
Convenor.
Eventually, reservations were overcome and the scheme in principle now 
has the full backing of the Council, although some of the details still 
have to be finalised.
Community ownership has been seen as a practical outworking of the 
Council*s commitment to area management and to increased tenant
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participation. ine council see community ownersnip as navmg a numDer 01 
advantages. These are outlined in Figure 24.
FIGURE 24: Advantages of Conmunity Ownership: the Council's View
1. It represents a further extension of the principle of 
effective management decentralisation.
2. It represents the ultimate form of tenant participation, 
providing a focus for resident involvement and action.
3. It directly fosters self-help, management responsibility and 
stabilises communities at risk.
4. It provides fresh employment opportunities in deprived areas.
5. There is no new claim on central government spending.
6. It may provide working examples of co-operative management 
leading to an improvement in local service delivery and the 
quality of life.
7. It will sustain the supply of improved property in socially 
rented tenures.
8. It will provide an infusion of funds from the private sector 
into areas of stressed public section housing.
9. It will benefit the current capital financing position of the 
remaining public sector stock.
10. It will allow non-Housing Revenue Account capital resources to 
be deployed and invested in multiply deprived areas.
11. It will reduce the Council's own recurring revenue expenditure 
and debt charges.
12. It will give tenants access to improvement grants, tax relief 
and Housing Benefit in a way no other tenure does.
SOURCE: Glasgow District Council Housing Department, November 1984.
With these advantages in mind, the Council have laid down the 
objectives of the COP as follows:
1. To direct capital housing allocations into areas of high stress.
2. To encourage more tenant control, participation and involvement.
3. To promote housing decentralisation.
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housing.
5. To create local employment opportunities.
6. To gain access to private sector resources for the benefit of the 
public sector.
These objectives seem broadly similar to those of the tenants. 
Naturally the tenants are not particularly concerned about the source of 
the grant funding, but they do share the Councilfs concern with tenant 
participation, housing decentralisation, self-reliance and local 
employment. We will see in the next section that Central Government would 
also share these views - the disagreement arises over the first objective, 
that of directing capital resources into high stress areas.
3. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
Glasgow District council have been in consultation with the Scottish 
Office throughout the past year concerning the proposals for community 
ownership. This is essential as the assent of the Secretary of State is 
required for the sale of the houses as they are not governed by the 
provisions of the Tenants Rights, Etc. (Scotland) Act, 1980.
It is difficult to assess the views of the Scottish Office on 
community ownership - this has to be judged from their correspondence and 
meetings with the District and from their more general policies on housing.
It appears that in general, the Scottish Office have expressed guarded 
approval for community ownership, which they see as "a most interesting and 
imaginative concept". The initiative is seen as having considerable 
potential for harnessing local energy and encouraging self-help, but there 
are some aspects of the scheme which give them cause for concern.
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These are mainly related to the independence of the co-op once 
established, and the question of finance.
The SDD has expressed concern that the co-op should have total control 
over their own affairs, including such aspects as letting of contracts, 
appointments, management after the initial two year development period and 
winding up procedures.
Secondly, they are anxious that !good value for money1 should be 
obtained for any public sector finance involved in supporting the running 
of the co-op and assisting the improvement and repair of the housing stock, 
as grants attract Exchequer contributions. It is unclear as to what 
constitutes 'good value for money1.
Several areas of conflict between the SDD and GDC immediately come to 
mind: the disposal price of the houses; the District Councilfs desire to 
invest private sector resources in what they see as publicly rented houses; 
and the conditions governing the disposal of the co-op.
Concerning the disposal price of the houses - the DC wish to sell the 
houses to the co-ops at a low price in order to make the co-ops financially 
viable. They would argue that the concept of market value is useless in 
this case as the houses can only be sold to the sitting tenants who clearly 
do not wish to buy them in the present condition. The exception to this is 
Broomhouse, where one tenant has purchased his house. In this case, the 
high valuation of the dwellings set by the City Estates Surveyor may 
threaten the viability of the co-op.
It can be assumed that the SDDfs concern about the full independence 
of the co-op, once established, is because they wish to ensure that this 
really is a form of owner occupation, not just a clever scheme to use 
private sector resources for publicly rented housing. The SDD wish the
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assets of the co-op, should it be wound up, in the same way as owner 
occupiers.
However, the DC are concerned that the tenants should have no interest 
in the assets - after all, they have no stake in the equity and have only 
contributed a nominal £1 share for membership. Since such large sums of 
public money are involved in terms of grant aid, it seems quite wrong that 
tenants should be able to gain large amounts of money by winding up the co­
op. At present there are proposals to alter the Minute of Agreement so 
that the Housing Corporation will decide on the disposal of any assets 
remaining after the discharge of any securities in favour of lending 
institutions.
Nevertheless, despite compromises by each party the main area of 
conflict between the District Council and the Scottish Office remains 
unresolved.
4. THE TRADE UNIONS
The main concern of the unions is to protect the jobs of their 
members. Initially there was some difficulty in obtaining the co-operation 
of the main unions involved: NALGO, the white collar workers union, the 
TGWU, the transport workers, UCAAT, the construction workers, GMBA, the 
boiler makers and EEPTU, the electricians and the plumbers. These groups 
were concerned that the proposals for community ownership were really 
privatisation in disguise and would threaten the jobs of their members.
Meetings were therefore held between the Unions, the Labour Executive 
and the community groups. These meetings led the Unions to conclude that 
if they continued to oppose the proposals they would be opposing the rights 
of the individuals and groups involved in the community co-ops and also
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if not improved, might well be demolished.
In addition, they were assured by Baillie James McLean, the Housing 
Convenor, that there would be no reduction in the existing staffing 
establishment as a result of Community Ownership.
Many comparable Housing Authorities have a much higher staff to houses 
ratio than Glasgow and a small reduction in the number of houses managed 
can help provide an improved service to the remaining Council tenants.
There are two particular areas of staffing that the unions are 
concerned about - the development staff and repair and maintenance 
contracts.
During the development period of two years, the Council intend to 
second staff to work as development officers for each co-op. These posts 
will be advertised internally at a salary grade of AP IV to POG I (i.e. 
£8,820 - £12,600) and will be appointed to Calvay, Broomhouse and 
Ballantay. In addition, a further three development officers may be 
rquired for future co-operatives at Possil, Priesthill, Southdeen, 
Ballindalloch and Cessnock during 1985-86. Several administrative posts 
for the co-ops are also to be filled internally.
The Building and Works Department of the DC will be given the 
opportunity to tender for all par-value co-ops as they do now for all 
tenant management co-ops and as they will have to do next year for the 
majority of housing maintenance.
However as we will see later, this may be a major source of conflict 
between the unions and the tenants.
In summary, the Council have put the following points in reply to the
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1. The co-op*s housing is for rent.
2. It would be improved with public money.
3. It would be both owned and controlled co-operatively by its members.
4. The general public and District Council tenants will continue to enjoy
access to this form of housing through the Council*s nomination 
policy. This would be enforced through the Minute of Agreement 
between the co-op and the Council.
5. The co-operative is a non-equity sharing scheme and the members lose 
both the right to buy and to sell.
These points seem to have convinced the unions and they are willing to 
let the proposal for community ownership to go ahead. However, it is 
interesting to note the way in which the COP has been presented to the 
unions as the ultimate form of socialism compared to the way it has been 
presented to the Scottish Office as a useful way of extending owner- , 
occupation! This point will be discussed at greater length in the next 
chapter.
CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES
At the beginning of this chapter it was maintained that it was 
important to outline the intent of the various groups involved in order to 
see if these conflicted in any way. We have, so far, discussed the views 
of the four main groups involved in community ownership: the tenants, the 
District Council, the Scottish Office and the trade unions, and it appears 
there are several areas of conflict between these groups. Some of these 
have been discussed briefly and drawing on these points, it is useful to 
outline three main areas of potential conflict. These are the following:
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political issues involved, particularly centred on the question of 
finance.
2. The tenants versus the trade unions on the question of jobs.
3. The tenants versus the Council on the independence of the co-ops, 
particularly on such management issues as allocation.
For the purposes of brevity the arguments on both sides have been 
simplified. Clearly these are complex issues and it is not possible to do 
them justice in such a short space.
1. Central Government Versus Glasgow District Council
The first area of potential conflict is between the SDD, the Central 
Governments representative and the District council. The source of the 
conflict is how each party views the COP.
Basically, the District Council see the co-operatives as an extension 
of the public sector. Tenants will be able to transfer between the co-op 
and the council sector if they so desire and time spent as a co-op tenant 
will accumulate points under the DCS allocation system. The Council are 
also retaining powers to nominate tenants to the co-op, which will be a 
source of great influence if they care to wield it.
In contrast, the SDD wish to ensure that the co-ops are as independent 
as possible, hence their concern over such matters as the letting of 
contracts, appointment of staff and so on. It may be assumed that the 
Scottish Office view the COP as a useful way of extending owner occupation 
into areas which are, at present, dominated by the public sector. Since it 
seems unlikely that any tenant in an area such as Ballantay should wish to
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ownership provides a means for implementing the Government's commitment to 
privatisation.
Therefore we can see that the Scottish Office and the Glasgow District 
Council have completely different views about the nature of the scheme. 
The Scottish Office appears to see it as owner occupation while the DC view 
it as an extension to the publicly rented sector. The tenants will receive 
some of the benefits of both tenures, for example, they will receive 
improvement grants, interest relief and housing benefit.
This differing view of the tenure of the COP also affects the way in 
which the District Council think about financing the project. They have 
stated that one of the objectives is to gain access to private sector 
resources for the benefit of the public sector. They also see the scheme 
as a useful way of deploying capital housing allocations in high stress 
areas. These areas have been designated by the Council to allow the 
identification of housing schemes most !at risk' through their unpopularity 
with tenants. The classification is based on three variables - vacancies, 
turnover and transfers out, supplemented by the local knowledge of area 
office staff. Both Ballantay and Calvay have been designated as Category 
1, the most problematic.
Figure 3 (p.97a) shows the location of the pilot schemes and the 
reserve list in relation to the DC's Priority Areas. From this we can see 
that only one pilot co-op (Ballantay) and two on the reserve list 
(Southdeen and Priesthill/Nitshill) fall within these Priority Areas. 
However, the information on which the Priority Areas are based is now
2. Only in Broomhouse has one tenant exercised the right to buy. This 
dwelling will be excluded from the co-op.
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to date, the majority of co-ops fall within high stress areas. Therefore 
it does appear that the COP is in line with the Councilfs objective of 
directing investment into areas of need. However, it is less certain that 
this policy of deploying the non-HRA block to a form of public housing is 
in line with the Governments expenditure policy.
2. The Tenants Versus The Trade Unions
The second area of conflict of interests arises over the question of
jobs. The unions have been reassured that staff will be seconded from the 
District Council for the initial two year development period. However, 
after that time the co-ops will have to employ their own management staff 
and there is no obligation on them to employ a member of the Councils 
staff. It is written into the Minute of Agreement that in the appointment 
of staff the co-op shall, all other things being equal, give preference to 
staff of the council with relevant experience. Such posts are to be 
advertised internally within the Council three weeks before advertising 
their availability to the general public. However, there is nothing to 
prevent the co-op from appointing suitably experienced staff from 
elsewhere, for example, the housing associations.
Concerning the letting of contracts for maintenance and repair work, 
the Councils Direct Labour Organistion will be able to tender for such 
work as they do at present for tenant management co-ops. However, this is
only one of the three management options available to the co-op. In this
respect, the Glasgow co-ops intend to follow the example of the housing co­
operatives in Scandinavia.
A recent paper on co-operatives in Swedent3] has outlined three models
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of provision of management and maintenance in use there.
(i) Self management, i.e. the co-op employs its own workers.
(ii) Employment of private contractors.
(iii) Buying of services from a secondary co-op.
Concerning the first model, it is quite possible that the co-op may 
choose to recruit staff who are resident in the local area, or even members 
of the co-op. After all, there are large numbers of skilled craftsmen 
unemployed in such areas and they would certainly have some advantages in 
terms of accessibility, speed of repairs and probably cost, over the 
employment of private contractors. Perhaps this is what the DC meant when 
it outlined one of the aims of the COP as treating local employment
opportunities. However, this does come into conflict with the desires of 
the unions, although it seems unlikely that the loss of such a small amount 
of work would seriously threaten jobs.
The third Swedish model mentioned, that of buying services from a 
secondary co-op, may be a possibility in Glasgow. Such secondary co-ops, 
which provide all types of services to co-ops, are already in existence in 
London, for example the Society for Co-operative Dwellings (SCD), which 
operates in South London, Solon Co-operatives Services Limited for the 
north, and the Greater London Secondary Housing Assocation which acts as a 
consultant for setting up tenant management co-ops.
Such secondary co-ops combine professional experience and training and 
education courses in the aims and practice of co-operatives. These have
3. Clapham, D. and Millar, M. (forthcoming), Housing Co-operatives In 
SwedenT Centre for Housing Research, University of Glasgow.
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resources were badly managed and when members did not appreciate the 
purpose of a co-operative *as their own responsibilities*.
A type of secondary co-op is to be set up in Glasgow, formed by the 
existing tenant mangement co-ops, par-value co-ops and community trusts. 
The aims of this are to service existing and new tenant management co-ops 
and to provide a "pre-co-operative" promotional role and post-co-operative 
education. This group is to be called "Co-operative and Community Trust 
Services".
There are eight main task related issues which this support group is 
to co-ordinate. These are:
1. Constitution and Registration.
2. Improvement and Repair Contracts and Section 44 Agency Agreements.
3. Private Finance.
4. Financial Evaluation.
5. Financial Monitoring, Audit and Control.
6. Housing Management Agency Services.
7. Technical Services.
8. Training, Education and Promotion.
Thus it appears that this group will be able to take over much of the 
responsibility for managing the co-op. However, co-ops will be free to buy 
only those services they want, so they may choose to buy some and employ a 
worker to do others.
In Sweden, co-operatives appear to have ben very successful in 
decentralising management and maintenance while still negotiating flexible 
working arrangements with the trade unions. Of course, this is helped by 
the structure of Swedish trade unions, which are wider in scope than
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3. The Tenants Versus Glasgow District Council
The third possible area of conflict may arise between the co­
operatives and the DC over the issue of how much independence the co-ops 
have.
Financially, at least in theory, they are totally idependent, 
receiving no direct subsidy. However, as has been previously outlined in 
Chapter 5, there will be various forms of indirect subsidy, mainly from the 
DC.
The SDD have insisted that the co-op should be free to let contracts 
and appoint consultants as they wish and that all contracts let directly or 
indirectly should be put to competitive tender. However, in other issues 
such as the allocation policy, the DC has a large degree of control. When 
a house becomes vacant, the Council will present a list of nominees to the 
co-op who must select the new tenant from this list. The co-op are obliged 
to offer the tenancy of the house to a nominee of the Council before 
advertising it to the general public. However, the Council may not always 
take up this right, as has happened in the case of housing associations.
Some have voiced reservations that the co-op may discriminate against 
certain religions or ethnic groups, the unemployed, single parents, the ex­
offender, the alcoholic, etc. However, this goes back to the question of 
the independence of the co-op. If the tenants do own and control their 
housing, then they have to be free to run it themselves, albeit within 
certain limits. There is an inevitable tension between the needs of 
certain groups for decent housing and the desire of tenants to choose who 
they see as fdecent people1 for their neighbours.
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How then will these tensions be resolved? Need they be resolved or is 
it possible for the co-op to function without resolution of these issues? 
One thing is certain: all the aspirations of each of these groups cannot
be fulfilled, there will need to be compromise in several areas.
For example, if the council wishes to nominate all new tenants, the 
residents will find it difficult to allocate houses to members of their own 
family, such as the elderly or young married couples. Perhaps the Council 
will not take up their full nomination rights but reduce this to every 
second let, for instance.
On the more political issues, it is difficult to see how community 
ownership can be regarded at the same time as owner occupation by the 
Scottish Office and a new publicly rented sector by the unions and the 
District Council. However, as Donnison (1975) points out, innovations in 
social policy always bring the threat of conflict, but different 
interpretations of the situation, and different aspirations do not 
necessarily produce conflict, provided all concerned can satisfy their 
aspirations within the same general pattern of development.
He goes on to say that:
"if their objectives can be reconciled in this way, 
people with divergent views have a remarkable capacity
for supporting developments whose purpose and
significance they describe in very different terms.
Conflict only begins seriously when different interests 
and aspirations cannot be reconciled in this way"
(Donnison, 1975, p.300).
This would seem to be the case here, that the tenants, the District 
Council and central government can all satisfy their major aspirations. 
The houses are to be improved in accordance with the tenants wishes without 
excessively high demands on the Exchequer, and if it is successful, both
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mileage out of it.
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
Given that the major aspirations of all those involved are broadly 
similar - to improve the houses and to create a sense of community - how 
should progress towards these goals be evaluated? What criteria are 
considered relevant?
Physical improvement is much the easier to measure and quantify. The 
most obvious way to do this is to evaluate the improvement with reference 
to the physical problems of the area before the co-op was set up. These 
physical problems of disrepair, lack of amenities and so on have been well 
documented in the feasibility studies. Thus the area could be evaluated on 
such factors as the physical repair and improvements to the dwellings. 
Other useful indicators might be:
provision of new amenities within the area, e.g. shops, play
facilities;
environmental improvement;
creation of defensible space, common areas divided up;
reduction of physical problems within dwellings,
e.g. noise penetration
condensation and/or water penetration 
provision of efficient heating system;
an adequate repair service
good routine maintenance,
e.g. regular repainting 
grass cutting 
landscape maintenance 
refuse removal 
litter collection;
greater security, privacy and protection
Clearly fa sense of community1 is a very difficult concept to measure.
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participating, both in the co-op and in the community at large. Perhaps a 
useful way of measuring participation would be a survey of the tenants to 
discover how much they feel involved in the life of their area.
This idea of participation seems to have two main dimensions - action 
and information. Action could be measured by asking tenants if they are, 
or have been, members of the committee or involved in community activities. 
Information concerns how much people know about the purpose of the co-op, 
its structure and formal organisation. However, we must bear in mind that 
some people will not participate due to other family or work commitments, 
while some may be involved in other aspects of community life apart from 
the co-op.
Participation also depends to some extent on the facilities available. 
Does the management structure of the co-op make it easy for people to get 
involved? Are there physical facilities available, such as shared 
utilities or a resource centre, to encourage involvement with onefs 
neighbours? All these questions will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. At present we are only concerned with ways of measuring community 
life or community spirit.
Some other useful indicators might be the following:
communal areas such as stairs kept clean and tidy;
involvement of tenants in community projects;
enough active people to run voluntary groups;
waiting list for houses in the area;
reduction in turnover;
reduction in vacancies;
reduced rates of vandalism;
provision of social facilities, e.g. youth clubs, social clubs.
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There are also many other advantages of *a sense of community1 which 
are difficult to quantify, such as a greater feeling of security, less fear 
of crime and so on.  ^ v -
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION
PREFACE
In the last chapter we discussed the question of evaluation with 
particular reference to the aspirations and goals of the different groups 
involved and potential areas of conflict. We then went on to outline some 
criteria which might be used to evaluate the COP against the two goals 
which seem common to the main parties involved. These are the provision of 
decent, affordable housing and the creation of a sense of community.
In this chapter we will try to draw some conclusions from what has 
gone before, focussing on the issues raised by the pilot studies described 
in Chapter 6 and the problems of evaluation outlined in Chapter 7.
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This thesis began by establishing the general context of public 
housing in Britain, describing the historical development of the sector and 
the influence of policies at a national level. We saw how the problems of 
the sector as a whole are manifested particularly clearly, though not 
exclusively, in DTL areas, and we reviewed some of the approaches to 
tackling such estates.
Against this background, Chapter 3 outlined the two-fold nature of 
Glasgow's housing problem, and in Chapter 4 we saw how Glasgow District 
Council has drawn on its experience of housing initiatives to develop a new 
model to improve public sector housing. This model was described in some 
detail in Chapter 5.
Having examined the model in theory, we then analysed how it will work 
in the three pilot study areas of Calvay, Ballantay and Broomhouse. In 
Chapter 7 we attempted to tackle the difficult issue of evaluation, taking 
into account the sometimes conflicting goals of the different parties 
involved. Chapter 8 brings together and reviews the findings of the case 
studies and discussed certain areas which need more investigation. The 
analysis focusses particularly on the future development of the COP and two 
features which are seen as crucial to its expansion, namely community 
action capacity and continued political feasibility.
However, before drawing conclusions about the future of the COP from 
our case studies, we must note the character of our evidence, the methods 
by which it was assembled, its limitations and likely biases. The most 
interesting material has been gleaned from informal discussion with the 
tenants about their aims for community ownership. There were also more 
formal interviews with officers and members of the District Council (a full 
list of those interviewed is given in Appendix 1). In such situations,
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responses may be unguarded, subjective rather than objective and biased by 
memory and the individual's own perceptions and viewpoint. It is difficult 
to get an objective description of an ongoing social phenomenon which 
directly touches peoples' lives.
Nevertheless, such opinions have been considered valuable. After all, 
it is difficult for people to be unbiased and objective about their hopes 
for their area. The researcher's own perceptions, preconceptions and 
misinterpretations must also be taken into account.
A further constraint has been the need for confidentiality - it has 
not always been possible to identify the source of statements or reveal all 
the information discovered. Finally, there is the inevitable compression 
and selection of material forced by word limits.
Given all this, the following discussion makes no claims to vigorous 
analysis - it is by necessity very informal, relying heavily on casual 
observation and subjective judgements. As was previously stated, there are 
no similar examples of community ownership in Britain to help us think 
about the future of the project. The paucity of our evidence means that 
much of the following section can be no more than informed speculation.
THE IMPACT OF THE COP
It is useful to consider the possible impact of the COP on those in 
context. A present, the problems are only emerging, due to the newness of 
the field, so effort is being concentrated on getting things done rather 
than thinking through the implications of success. We will consider the 
impact on some of the groups involved in turn.
For the tenants there may be other spin-offs, apart from the obvious 
benefits of improving their area and gaining control. The activists, those
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sense of their own capacity. It has been argued that the primary 
characteristics of disadvantaged communities is lack of self-esteem. As an 
individual participates, his degree of dignity and self-confidence should 
increase: the more he participates, the more he is able to do so. In 
addition, the success of the COP might lead to these people being given 
credibility by society at large.
The success of the scheme will certainly be a feather in the cap of 
Glasgow District Council. At the moment, a number of other housing 
authorities have shown an interest in the COP, enhancing the authority's 
reputation for innovation in housing projects. The scheme will also 
further the Council's policy of deploying capital resources in stress areas 
and will, according to the council, benefit the position of the remaining 
council tenants through more resources being made available.
However, if the COP were to expand to a large proportion of the 
council's stock, this might have an adverse effect on the remaining council 
tenants. In effect, community ownership might increase what has been 
described as residualisation. The expansion of co-operatives may lead to 
the development of a two tier publicly rented sector - co-operatives, with 
all the associated advantages, and traditional council housing. This may 
be seen as housing of last resort for those who have no choice, rather than 
at present, when it is the majority tenure in the city, at 57.1/6.
THE FUTURE OF THE COP
There area number of other tenants' groups on the reserve list who 
have already appointed consultant architects, accountants and laywers and 
are waiting anxiously in the wings. If the pilot schemes are a success, 
those groups are prepared to set up their own co-ops. Thus there are
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already plans to expand the COP from the initial 3 pilot areas. It may be 
useful, therefore, to consider the future expansion of the scheme and what 
factors may limit its spread.
It is suggested that the project will expand, but only to a minority 
of council housing. This is for two main reasons, community action 
capacity and continued political feasibility, which led to the development 
of community ownership in the first place and in future will partly 
determine its expansion. We will consider each of these variables in turn.
COMMUNITY ACTION CAPACITY
As was outlined in Chapter 6, the fact that the COP has come this far 
is largely due to the commitment of the tenants* groups involved. For many 
members of the steering committee, the development of the co-ops has been a 
full time job for the last 15-18 months. The group at Ballantay, for 
example, man their office for four hours every day, which represents a 
major commitment from such a small group of residents. At Calvay, only two 
of the ten steering committee members are in part time paid employment, the 
others are all unemployed, as they are at Ballantay. Many of those people 
attend several meetings every week, write letters, answer telephone
r 11enquiries and so on, despite domestic and other responsibilities.L1J
Thus it would appear that with the present model, a great deal of 
(unpaid) time and effort is required from tenants groups committed to 
setting up the co-opeartives. Hopefully, this workload will decrease when 
a development officer is appointed to each co-op. However this may be a 
limiting factor on the expansion of the COP, as any potential co-op would
1. At Broomhouse the position is slightly different as the co-op employ a 
part time administrator, Mrs. Beth Reilly.
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have to have individuals both able and willing to give their time.
It is unlikely that any person in full time employment could give this 
amount of time to setting up a co-op: it is significant that no member of 
the steering committee is at present in a full time job. Therefore it 
could be argued that a potential co-op is more likely to be in an area 
where there is a high level of unemployment.
As well as having the time, an individual must also be willing to 
devote time to setting up a co-op. This is perhaps a more significant 
point. The impetus for community ownership has come from tenants who are 
dissatisfied with their present housing conditions, who are keen to run 
their housing as they feel it cannot get any worse! There does not appear 
to be the same interest in the scheme from tenants in well run, pleasant 
estates. It may well be that the COP has engendered such a response from 
tenants groups not because of their innate desire for participation but
because of the failure of the DC to tackle the problems of their area.
Thus it appears that for a co-op to be set up, there must be a tenants 
group who are both willing and able to put in the work involved, and also 
who see the need for such a scheme in their area. However, so far we have 
only discussed the initial stages of setting up the co-op. For it to 
succeed in practice, and to achieve its aim of ncreating a sense of 
community", the ordinary members also need to participate.
This notion of participation is central to the creation of community - 
the opportunity to be involved in controlling onefs own environment and 
having some degree of self-determination. It has been argued that 
participation has an integrative function, generating a feeling of 
belonging. Without participation, the role of landlord may be recreated, 
along with is concommitant relations of dependency. Non-participating
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members may attempt to invest this role in the committee and the committee 
may organise the system to sustain their power and resist change, creating 
alienation, distrust and tension
THE ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE
Though the role of the landlord or owner is abolished, some formal 
structure is necessary simply to get things done, if total direct democracy 
is not possible. It is envisaged that the co-ops will be run by a 
democratically elected management committee, who will appoint their own 
staff, or buy services as necessary. The amount of autonomy held by the 
committee and the rights and duties of members will be outlined in the 
Model Rules of the Co-op.
However, the committee may experience a tension in their role as both 
managers of property and as consumers of the services the co-op provides. 
There may also be a conflict of interests over which community they serve - 
their network of friends and relations, the co-op as a whole or the wider 
community. It may not be possible to prevent certain interest groups 
gaining control. After all participation can be interpreted in a number of 
ways. Self-help can be seen as a way to justify an individual improving 
his position at the expense of others, while community control may provide 
a cover for religious, ethnic or class discrimination.
The sheer volume of decisions that have to be made, and the 
increasingly technical issues involved may lead the ordinary member to 
become dependent on the committee. Alternatively, the co-op may become 
over-reliant on their professional staff and delegate the decision making 
to them.
Another potential development is that over time, the committee may
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begin to reflect a housing management view of the area, and in the process 
become alienated from the membership. Certainly it does appear that the 
steering committees of the Glasgow co-ops have become much more sympathetic 
to the views of the DC since they have been involved with them during the 
development period. Perhaps this is due to the rapport that has developed 
with some of the officers involved and that the tenants have come to 
realise some of the constraints faced by the Council.
NON-PARTICIPATING MEMBERS
Genuine co-operation lies in the active participation of all members. 
The factors which influence participation are many: an explicit belief in 
democracy, loyalty and affection for the area, length of residence in the 
area and strong local connections. However, while some members may be 
unable to participate, due to other commitments or ill health, others may 
be unwilling. How far does the faverage tenant1 wish to participate? Is 
he happy to leave it to others if it is done properly? Can you force 
people to participate?
SUMMARY
The development of the co-ops so far leads one to the conclusion that 
co-operation has been essentially pragmatic rather than idealistic. For 
the initiators, the co-operative is seen as a convenient way of achieving 
their aims, rather than an end in itself. The nature of the scheme has led 
to a concentration on the practical issues of rehabilitation, rather than 
the philosophy of participation.
So far we have argued that a group of committed tenants is needed to 
set up a co-op, and tenant participation essential for it to be a success 
in terms of its declared objectives. There appear to be two aspects of
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participation which are critical for the success and future expansion of 
the co-ops.
First, there is the need to sustain the level of commitment. Similar 
projects elsewhere have shown a decline in interest after the buildings are 
rehabilitated. The group unite to fight the common enemy but do not remain 
together once it is defeated. There is a need, therefore, to promote a 
participative style and to generate a debate which will involve as many 
people as possible.
Second, what will happen if the aspirations for the project are not 
met by the reality of peoplefs behaviour? To an extent, the arguments so 
far have been environmentally deterministic - better houses will lead to 
better people. However, some problems, such as vandalism will not go away. 
The co-op may in effect, merely relocate the place where the debate goes 
on. What will happen to the people who are disadvantaged under the present 
system - the single homeless, the alcoholics, ex-offenders, ex-mental 
patients and so on. Will they be offered houses by the co-ops, or will 
they merely be confined to an increasingly smaller, more residualised 
public sector?
CONTINUED POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
At the beginning of this section it was maintained that two 
considerations would affect the future expansion of the COP. We have, so 
far, discussed only one of these, namely community action capacity. The 
other consideration concerns the continued political feasibility necessary 
for the projects expansion.
The continuation of the COP is dependent on the approval of the 
Scottish Office. The permission of the Secretary of State is needed for 
many aspects of the scheme, such as the sale of the houses, and the DC are
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still awaiting borrowing consent for an additional £5m for 1985-86 to help 
fund the co-ops. Thus the scheme could not expand without SDD aproval, or 
for that matter, the approval of the District Council members or the trade 
unions.
This notion of feasibility is an elusive concept, involving several 
different ideas. The work of Hall et al (1975) was found to be of value in 
developing this line of thought. They outline several aspects of 
feasibility which appear to be relevant in this context.
First, feasibility is not independent of who does the judging. 
Particular ideologies will affect the kinds of conclusions drawn about 
feasibility, and actors in the policy making process are likely to assess 
feasibility differently as they are aware of different sets of constraints. 
For example, the trade unions, whose primary concern is safeguarding the 
jobs of their members, will have a very different conception of the 
feasibility of expanding the COP from the tenants1 groups on the reserve 
list.
While this may seem self-evident, it answers the question as to why 
the COP was not implemented before. Constraints change over time - such a 
project was previously unnecessary as local government had adequate funds 
to tackle public housing problems.
The second point made by Hall et al is that feasibility is rarely 
immediately apparent - consequences will be estimated and modifications 
made. This particularly applies to resources: a solution which requires 
less rather than more expenditure will be preferred, as will one which 
distributes additional costs in ways which do not concentrate them on 
the Exchequer. This is an important point for the expansion of the COP. 
At present Glasgow District Council are seeking an additional borrowing
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consent of £5m from Central Government. While this can be viewed as a one- 
off payment, in that there will be no recurring charges for repairs, 
maintenance and management, the sum involved would increase substantially 
if the COP was to expand. Perhaps this would lead the Scottish Office to 
reconsider the feasibility of the project.
Hall et al also develop the concept of issue characteristics. These 
determine what increases feasibility; factors which affect the overall 
'•image” of an issue and which more specifically influences its fortunes. 
These are particularly useful to illustrate the way in which community 
ownership gained political feasibility and how this would be influenced by 
its expansion.
(1) Association and Scope
Few issues remain unrelated to others - problems are linked and one 
solution overlaps another. Successful pressure group activity is often the 
result of an ability or an opportunity to present an issue together with or 
separate from other issues. For example, when the members of GDC were 
initially apprehensive about community ownership, it was presented to them 
by the Labour Executive as part of the long history of socialism which goes 
back to Robert Owen. In this case, the strategy of extension was 
successful.
(2) Crises
The concept of crises is useful in accounting for the relatively 
sudden and prominent attention paid by government to certain issues. In 
the case of Glasgow's housing problem, the members of the Council have used 
the media to try to bring public attention to the crisis of disrepair in 
the City's housing stock. The recent issue of Housing Plan VIII in late
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While crises typically arise from episodes or events, they can, as in 
this case, be generated by redefinition or discovery of an existing 
situation or identification of an emerging trend.
(3) Trend Expectation and Prevention
Housing disrepair is clearly an issue which, if not attended to, will 
become more acute and urgent; it is cumulative and progressive. Such 
issues which can be shown to be growing more pressing, can gain priority 
before a crisis is reached, as a form of prevention. In particular, 
estimates of rising costs can be regarded as issues in themselves.
In the case of community ownership, the proposals can be viewed as 
precautionary or preventative, to prevent a bad situation becoming worse. 
This appears to have been one factor which influenced the trade unions to 
give their consent to the scheme - otherwise some of the houses would have 
been demolished.
(4) Origin
Issues do not arise spontaneously - they are formulated by particular 
groups or individuals. This is true of both problems and solutions, hence 
it is important to know whose issue it is. An interesting point about the 
development of the COP is that it is difficult to find the origin of the 
idea. The tenants say the Council suggested it, while the Council say that 
the impetus came from the community. However, this is to its advantage. 
When issues are closely identified with one group or political party, this 
obviously assists them while that party is in power but obstructs them when 
it is in opposition. In this case, community ownership has become 
associated with both political parties and each see it as fulfilling some
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(5) Information
The extent to which an issue's existence or urgency can be 
substantiated by acceptable facts has a particular impact on its progress. 
Many of the facts involved in the COP are numerical; facts about problems 
of decay and dampness, vacancy rates and turnover. They are seen as 
particularly authoritative as they come from an accredited source, local 
government. They also show the indisputable failure of an existing policy 
in attaining publicly stated objectives.
(6) Ideology
The criteria of feasibility is interpreted in ways that reflect 
ideological convictions. For an issue to accord with the prevailing 
ideology of a party in power improves its likelihood of gaining priority. 
One important aspect of the COP that has contributed greatly to its 
political acceptability at all levels is the way that it changes complexion 
to suit the prevailing political climate. It can be seen as all things to 
all men. To Conservatives (in this case Central Government) par-value co­
ops can be seen as self-help, a form of collective ownership which helps to 
extend owner-occupation to lower income groups. Hence the name chosen, 
community ownership.
To socialists, in this case the District Council members and the 
unions, it has been presented as grass roots socialism, an acceptable 
alternative to the private rented sector. If nothing else, this is 
certainly diplomacy! However, the fact that the scheme appears to be
politically acceptable to all shades of political opinion suggests that the
r
simple categories of traditional socialism and traditional conservatism are
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outdated. ±n tnis case tney appear to De O DScunng trie rear issues anu 
misleading the contenders on both sides.
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has attempted to outline some possible future 
deelopments of the COP and the factors which might influence this. We have 
examined the limitations of community action capacity and tenant 
participation. These are important areas for the tenants involved and may 
well determine the success or otherwise of the scheme.
In addition we have discussed some aspects of the way in which 
community ownership has gained political feasibility and how this is 
necessary for its continuation and expansion. It is possible that as the 
scheme develops, the feasibility could change. For example, if the co-ops 
remain under the control of the District Council, the Scottish Office could 
withdraw funds. At present the issue appears to occupy the uneasy position 
of sitting on the political fence. In the future, either the Scottish 
Office or the trade unions could withdraw their support, preventing any new 
co-ops developing.
The future of the scheme may also be influenced by factors outwith the 
control of local government, such as changes in national housing policy. 
For example, if the distinction between the HRA and the non-HRA blocks was 
changed in Scotland to bring it into line with England, this would alter 
one of the main raison d!etre of the co-ops.
For the present, therefore, these must remain interim conclusions. 
Only in the light of future experience can any firm conclusions be drawn 
about the success of the Community Ownership Programme in tackling the 
problems of some of Glasgow!s high stress housing estates.
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